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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on empirical macroeconomics and financial
markets in the United States. Although they can be considered as three independent essays,
their findings are connected with each other in some way. For example, all three essays
support a point of view that in empirical research, carefully investigating any abnormal
changes in the data is important and sometimes can be a breakthrough. The first essay
investigates the incorrect calculation of nonborrowed reserves and finds that it should
account for the unclear indications of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy. The second
essay finds that the repurchase agreement rates (repo rates) can better forecast monetary
policy by ignoring recent abnormal data. This finding further supports the first essay's point
of view that good quality data is very import for the clear indications of the Federal
Reserve's monetary policy. The third essay finds that 3-month Treasury bill rates were not
sensitive to the discount rate changes during the "Great Recession", since the discount rate
was above the federal funds rate during that period of time, which never occurred before in
the U.S. history and caused the discount window borrowing to lose its function.
The first essay investigates the nonborrowed reserves calculations and finds that the
accounting method for calculating nonborrowed reserves has recently changed with an
inaccurate result. This paper tries different ways to correct nonborrowed reserves and
explores the implications of monetary policy. These experiments show the robustness of the
well-structured semi-VAR model developed by Bernanke and Mihov (1995), since in this
model, bad data never works as well as good data; doctored data never works as well as real
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data. Furthermore, this paper finds that the best indicator of monetary policy is still the
federal funds rate. The inaccurate nonborrowed reserves calculation is at least one of the
reasons which accounts for the unclear indications of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy
during the recent financial crisis.
The second essay tests the performance of expectation theory by using various repo
rates and Treasury bill rates and explores whether repo rates have more significant
forecasting power for monetary policy than Treasury bill rates. Since the recent financial
crisis created so much abnormal data, which may influence the forecasting result, this paper
will also compare the forecasting ability between various repo rates and Treasury bill rates
by ignoring the recent data. As a result, the forecasting performances are improved, just as
expected. In fact, this paper finds the use of 3-month repo rates for forecasting federal funds
rates is extremely strong. Furthermore, this paper will test and compare the forecasting
ability of the government, agency and mortgage repo rates and explore whether any of these
three repo rates can be considered as a better riskless rate than Treasury bill rates.
The third essay explores the market response to the discount rate changes during the
recent U.S. recessions and finds that the response of market rates to discount rate changes
varied during the recent two recessions. The different responses of market rates to discount
rate changes are due to the various economic and policy circumstances that the market was
facing. This conclusion is consistent with Thornton's finding (1998). Thornton (1998) found
that the different market responses to the discount rate changes mainly depend on the
information content that people believed contained in the announcements of the discount rate
changes. It's interesting to point out that during the "Great Recession", market rates were not
sensitive to discount rate changes. The underlying reason was the discount rates were above
v
the federal funds rates during the "Great Recession". In other words, the discount window
borrowing has lost its function to provide adequate funds to the economy during the
recession.
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1 Chapter 1: Empirical tests of measuring monetary policy and its
implications on macroeconomics
ABSTRACT
A considerable amount of research has explored the indicator for the Federal
Reserve's monetary policy and the reactions of macro-economic variables to this
monetary policy. Few existing works explore the Federal Reserve data that was used for
measuring monetary policy. This paper investigates the nonborrowed reserves calculation
and finds that the accounting method for calculating nonborrowed reserves has changed in
an inaccurate way recently. This paper tries different ways to correct nonborrowed
reserves and explores the indications of the monetary policy. These experiments show the
robustness of the well-structured semi-VAR model developed by Bernanke and Mihov
(1995), since in this model, bad data never works as well as good data; doctored data
never works as well as real data. Furthermore, this paper finds that the best indicator of
monetary policy is still the federal funds rate. The inaccurate nonborrowed reserves
calculation is at least one of the reasons which accounts for the unclear indications of the
Federal Reserve's monetary policy during the recent financial crisis.
2
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Inaccurate data in the Fed
1.1.1.1 Abnormal nonborrowed reserves
Suddenly on January, 1st, 2008, the nonborrowed reserves of U.S. banks became
negative. Then they increased to as large as 486 billion in June, 2009 (figure1.1).
First of all, this was the first time nonborrowed reserves had been in a negative
number. How can borrowed reserves exceed total reserves? It is an accounting error. A
simple example: If there is a 6 inch apple pie on the table, what the Federal Reserve was
doing was taking an 8 inch apple pie from the original one.
Secondly, the large increase in nonborrowed reserves later was due to the fact that
total reserve was expanded by the Federal Reserve, but the Fed was still using an
inaccurate accounting method which failed to include all the Term Auction Facility (TAF)
borrowing in the total reserves.
1.1.1.2 Poor monetary-aggregate data
The Federal Reserve still uses the simple sum monetary aggregate data rather than
Divisia index monetary aggregate data which has already been applied by many other
countries. Simple sum aggregate data is inaccurate. You can not compare apples to oranges.
The Federal Reserve cannot combine money in the checking account to savings account,
since they have different costs known as the "user cost".1 It costs more to hold the money
in a checking account than in a savings account. The bank has to be compensated for
providing extra liquidity if one holds money in a checking account.
1.1.1.3 No pre-sweeps data
Barnett (2010) pointed out that M1 aggregates are far below actual data. Banks only
1 See Barnett and Serletis (2000) for "the user cost of money".
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provide the Federal Reserve post-sweeps checking account data but no pre-sweeps data.
In order to provide the Federal Reserve with less required reserves, banks usually transfer
checking account deposits into savings account. In this case, the Federal Reserve is not
able to monitor the exact liquidity, since money in the checking accounts is one of the
most important channels to provide liquidity. To be accurate, they should have both pre-
sweeps and post-sweeps data.
1.1.2 The Fed and the financial crisis
Both Barnett and Chauvet (2011) and Taylor (2008) showed that the monetary
excesses were the main cause of the recent financial crisis. Furthermore, Hanke (2011)
has updated the recent data and pointed out that no money supply (Divisia M4) and a very
"weak" economy will not give us much confidence in the economy at least in the near
future.
Barnett and Chauvet (2011) checked the Federal Reserve's simple sum monetary
aggregate data and found it is far biased from index number theory, which misled both the
public and the Fed's policy to take more risks and provide the market excess money
before the recent financial crisis. In consequence, it might be a main cause of the recent
sub-prime mortgage crisis.
Taylor (2008) found empirical evidence that government interventions caused the
sub-prime mortgage crisis. The Federal Reserve set the interest rate deviating from the
historical principles and thus provided the market with excess money.
Although Taylor (2008) did not explain in his paper why the Federal Reserve set the
interest rate so low before the financial crisis, one of the underlying reasons can be that
the Fed's faulty simple sum monetary aggregate data was far biased from the actual
monetary aggregate data. By monitoring the inaccurate simple sum monetary aggregate
data, the Federal Reserve set the federal funds rates so low than it should be. In other
words, the Fed provided the market excess money before the sub-prime mortgage crisis,
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which is consistent with Barnett and Chauvet's findings (2011).
Hanke (2011) has updated the recent Divisia M4 data and pointed out that the
money supply growth data M2 published by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System has grown rapidly. While the Divisia M2 has decreased, the broader
money measurement M4 decreased even more rapidly and is now currently flat. No
money supply (Divisia M4) and a very "weak" economy will not give us much confidence
in the economy at least in the near future. Once again, the Federal Reserve has misled
both the public and itself by using the simple-sum monetary aggregate data M2.
1.1.3 The importance of high quality data in the "information age"
Information is more important today than ever, since we are in the "information age",
especially when the internet is so widely used and so many portable wireless devises are
invented. Let's take stock market as an example. Stock price may respond to various
information shocks. As an investor, the first thing to do is to collect the correct
information quickly and analyze how the market will respond to those information shocks
and then make an appropriate decision. Before the internet was widely created, people
could only trade at a certain place such as the New York Exchange. However, now one
can sit at home in Shanghai and trade U.S. stock just by clicking a "buy" or "sell" button
on an e-trading platform such as "Scottrade". High quality data and information is so
valuable today, people have to pay thousands of dollars to get them. If one wants to get
the repo rates data, the only place that provides that historical data so far as I know is the
Bloomberg system. However, it is not free.
"In economic theory, the economic system is highly sensitive to information
shocks."2 The economic system's dynamics could be hurt by even the irrelevant
information shocks.
2 See Barnett (2012).
5
1.1.4 The Term Auction Facility
The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was established on December 12, 2007. It
allowed the Federal Reserve to provide funds to depository institutions. First of all, banks
were not willing to borrow from the discount windows, because that would signal the
bank's insolvency. Secondly, since the Federal Reserve used a new method in setting the
discount rate (the rate used when banks borrow at the discount window) since 2003,
which thus became the first time in the U.S. history that the discount rates were higher
than the federal funds rates during a recession, which will cause an even worse liquidity
problem. Thirdly, the credit was so tight at the recent financial crisis; banks were not
willing to lend to one another. TAF borrowing was established to accommodate the
unique problem of the recent financial crisis.
The TAF provides banks with other benefits as well. For instance, the TAF allows
banks to borrow against a wide range of collaterals. Moreover, the TAF has the potential
to lower a bank's overall funding cost.
1.2 Motivation and Goal
It is the first time nonborrowed reserves have been in negative (figure1.1) since
1959.
The formula the Federal Reserve used to calculate nonborrowed reserves up to
December 12, 2007 was:
Nonborrowed reserves = Total reserves – DiscountWindow Borrowings
Then on December 12, 2007, the Federal Reserve started using the following
formula:
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Nonborrowed reserves = Total reserves – DiscountWindow Borrowings
– TAF borrowing
The negative value of nonborrowed reserves was because total borrowings were
larger than the total reserves. Not all TAF borrowing was included in total reserves, thus
negative nonborrowed reserves occurred. I have sent e-mails to the Federal Reserve
asking how much TAF borrowing was hold in total reserves. Unfortunately, the staff at
the Federal Reserve could not give me a satisfactory answer.
If the Federal Reserve changed the accounting method for nonborrowed reserves
intentionally, then did they also change the monetary policy indicator? Although the
Federal Reserve claimed that the federal funds rate is used as the monetary policy
instrument, the Federal Reserve does not always do as it says. Thus it makes sense to
recheck the monetary policy indicator. How does the policy stance today compare with
what it was in earlier periods? Furthermore, this paper will use the corrected
nonborrowed reserves and re-evaluate various implications of the monetary policy.
Last but not least, this paper will be an additional support for Barnett's proposal (2012)
for creating the Fed's own data bureau by examining another Federal Reserve's
inaccurate data.
1.3 Literature Review
1.3.1 Relevant methodology
Bernanke and his coauthors had a series of papers in exploring a good indicator of
monetary policy actions.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) found that the federal funds rate is very informative
about future movements of real macroeconomic variables. The federal funds rate was
found to be a good indicator of monetary policy actions.
Bernanke and Mihov (1995) developed a VAR-based methodology for measuring
the stance of monetary policy by applying and extending the approach of Strongin (1992),
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Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and Christano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994). Bernanke
and Blinder (1992) used structural VAR model to study the relationships among money,
credit and income. Strongin (1992) proposed a new method of identifying monetary
policy by using nonborrowed reserves.
Bernanke and Mihov (1995) developed a "semi-structural" VAR approach, which
makes restrictions on policy block but leaves the macroeconomic variables unrestricted.
The methodology nests earlier VAR-based measures and can be used to choose the best
monetary policy indicator for macro economics. By using this model, Bernanke and
Mihov (1995) successfully found that during 1979 to1982, the nonborrowed reserve
model was strongly accepted, which suggested that nonborrowed reserve is the best
indicator for monetary policy. This period overlaps Volcker’s experimental
nonborrowed reserve targeting period exactly.
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) further applied a "semi-structural" VAR model for
exploring monetary policy's effects on macroeconomic variables.
1.3.2 The effects of the Federal Reserve's faulty data on financial crisis
Both Barnett and Chauvet (2011) and Taylor (2008) showed that the monetary
excesses were the main cause of recent financial crisis. Barnett and Chauvet (2011)
checked the Federal Reserve's simple sum monetary aggregate data and found it is far
deviated from index number theory, which misled both the public and the Federal
Reserve's policy to take more risks and provide the market with excess money before the
recent financial crisis. In consequence, it may have contributed to the recent sub-prime
mortgage crisis. Taylor (2008) found empirical evidence that government interventions
caused the sub-prime mortgage crisis. The Federal Reserve set the interest rate deviating
from the historical principles and thus provided the market with excess money. Although
Taylor (2008) did not explain why the Federal Reserve set the interest rate so low before
the financial crisis, one of the underlying reasons can be the Fed's faulty simple-sum
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monetary aggregate data misled the Fed's decision on setting the low federal funds rate,
which is consistent with Barnett and Chauvet (2011)'s findings.
Furthermore, Hanke (2011) has updated the recent Divisia M4 data and pointed out
that the money supply growth data M2 published by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System has grown rapidly. While the DIvisia M2 has decreased, the
broader money measurement M4 decreased even more rapidly and is now currently flat.
No money supply (Divisia M4) and a very "weak" economy will not give us much
confidence in the economy at least in the near future. Once again, the Federal Reserve has
misled both the public and itself by using the simple-sum monetary aggregate data M2.
1.4 Methodology
This paper will use semi-structural VAR methodology developed by Bernanke and
Mihov in 1995. The so called “Semi-structural VAR” means that half of the model is
unrestricted, while the remaining half is restricted. In particular, the semi-structural VAR
model which this paper is going to apply imposes restriction on block of policy indicators
and no restrictions on macroeconomic variables. How to impose appropriate restrictions
on block of policy indicators is extremely important. The effectiveness of this semi-
structural VAR comes from the success of imposing the specific restrictions on these
policy indicators. In order to do this, Bernanke and Mihov (1995) made a progress in
exploring the underlying relationships and connections among policy indicators, which
made this VAR model closer to the real world and thus more applicable.
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"Y" are vectors of macroeconomic variables including real GDP, GDP deflator and
consumer-price-index for all urban consumers.
"P" are policy indicators containing federal funds rate, total reserves and
nonborrowed reserves.
Equation (1) represents that the macroeconomic variables depend on current, lagged
values of macroeconomic variables and lagged values of policy indicators. In other words,
policy indicators have no contemporaneous effect on macroeconomic variables. v y are
structural error terms. A y is a general matrix.
Equation (2) expresses that the policy variables depend on both current and lagged
values of policy variables and macroeconomic variables. This model assumes
macroeconomic variables have contemporaneous effect on policy indicators. pv are
structural error terms.
We can rewrite equation (2) into the following,
(3)             + + +
     (4)         +
k k
p p
t i t -i i t -i t t
i 0 i=1
k k
p p
t i t -i i t -i t
i 0 i=1
= 0
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Assume u pt is the VAR residuals in the policy block. From equation (4), we can get
-1
0(5)                = ( ,   )u vG AIp p pt t−
By rewriting equation (5) and dropping both subscripts and superscripts, equation (6)
is derived:
(6)                =   +   .u  Gu vA
Equation (6) connects observable VAR residuals u and unobserved structural shocks
v together.
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1.5 Models
In order to connect the observable VAR residuals and the unobservable shocks in the
policy block, a specific model is needed. Bernanke and Mihov (1995) used a standard and
basic model of the market for bank reserves and the Fedederal Reserve's operating
procedure.
µ is the observable VAR residual. ν is the unobservable shock. The market for bank
reserves is expressed in the following equations from (7) to (9):
(7)             u u      
(8)             u (u u )
(9)           u .
d
TR FFR
b
BR FFR DISC
d d b b s
NBR
v
v
v v v
= −α +
= β − +
= φ + φ +
Equations (7) through (9) are all in the innovation forms and in the form of equation
(6).
Equation (7) expresses that the demand for total reserves has a negative relationship
with federal funds rate and a demand shock. This equation explains the market behavior
of borrowing at the federal funds market.
Equation (8) represents that the demand for borrowed reserves has a positive
relationship with federal funds rate, since borrowed reserves can be lent to other banks at
the federal funds rate. Thus, banks are willing to borrow more from the discount window,
if the federal funds rate is higher. At the same time, the demand for borrowed reserves
correlates negatively on the discount rate and a disturbance. This equation explains the
market behavior of borrowing at the discount window.
Equation (9) represents the Federal Reserve's behavior. Bernanke and Mihov (1995)
assume that the Federal Reserve reacts to both demand for total reserve shocks and
borrowed reserve shocks. The strength of the response is denoted as dφ and bφ . It makes
sense to assume the Federal Reserve's response to those two demands, since the Federal
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Reserve monitors the total reserves and borrowed reserves all the time. sv is the policy
shock.
By rewriting equation (6) , equation (10) can be derived:
-1(10)              = ( ,)−u I G Av
Where
' ' [[ u      u     u ]             ]d s bTR NBR FFR v v v==u v
The matrix can be written out, by solving for equation (7) through (9).
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⎢ ⎥        φ                               1                φ
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥    )(1− φ )      −          − )(1+ φ ) 
⎢ ⎥α + β α + β α + β⎣ ⎦
−(  ( 
         (11)
( ( 
The equation (10) has seven unknown parameters (α,β,ϕd,ϕb, variances of vd,vs, vb).
However, it has only six covariances3. Thus, it is under-identified by one restriction.
Bernanke and Mihov (1995) further consider five alternative models to impose further
restrictions on this under-identified model. The first four models impose two additional
restrictions, which makes the model over-identified. The fifth model imposes only one
restriction, which leaves the model just-identified.
By rearranging equation (11), we can get equation (12):
(12)   )()1()( FFR
bd
NBR
b
TR
bdsv µβφαφµφµφφ −−+++−=
3 Six covariances:
).cov(
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Equation (12) expresses that monetary policy shock vs depends on innovations in
total reserves, nonborrowed reserves, and federal funds rates without further restrictions.
The differences of following five models depend on how the assumptions are made
on the parameters. We can plug the assumed parameters in equation (12) and get the
newly derived monetary policy shock vs.
The first model is called federal funds rate model, which was established by
Bernanke and Blinder (1992). They assume ϕd = 1 and ϕb = -1. The Federal Reserve
targets the federal funds rate, so it completely offsets shocks to demand for both total
reserves and borrowing at the discount window. Equation (12) becomes FFRsv µβα )( +−= .
The monetary policy shock only comes from the innovation of federal funds rate, since in
the federal funds rate model, the federal funds rate is the only monetary policy instrument
by assumption.
Equation (11) becomes:
1( )G AI −−
1
α⎡ ⎤  1              0 ⎢ ⎥α + β⎢ ⎥
  1            1           −1⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥  0        −       0
α + β⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
   
=          (12)
The second model is called nonborrowed reserves model. Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1991) developed this model by assuming that the nonborrowed reserves
react solely to shocks of monetary policy. The implied restrictions are 0, 0d bφ = φ = . In
this case, monetary policy shock becomes NBRsv µ= . The monetary policy shock is from
the innovation of nonborrowed reserve.
Equation (11) can be written as:
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The third model is the orthogonalized nonborrowed reserves created by Strongin
(1992). He assumes that the shocks to total reserves are only demand shocks. Thus the
restriction becomes 0, 0bα = φ = .
Equation (11) now becomes:
1( )G AI −−
1 1 1
d
d
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥1                  0              0 
⎢ ⎥
= φ                 1              0⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥(1− φ )    −          −  
β β β⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
         (14)
The fourth model is the borrowed reserves model. The Fed targets the borrowed
reserves sometimes. So the implied restriction is 1, /d bφ = φ = α β . This model was
developed by Cosimano and Sheehan (1994).
Equation (11) takes the form of:
1( )G AI −−
1 1
⎡ ⎤α α
1                 ⎢ ⎥α + β β⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥α
= 1                 1                ⎢ ⎥β⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
0           −          −  ⎢ ⎥α + β β⎣ ⎦
       
         (15)
 
The fifth model is the just identified model. Strongin (1992) assumes that the
demand for total reserves is not elastic at all in a short period of time, so 0α = .
Equation (11) can be further written out specifically as:
14
1( )G AI −−
1 1 1
d b
d b
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥      1                0                 0          
⎢ ⎥
=       φ               1                 φ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥    (1− φ )    −          − (1+ φ ) 
β β β⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
         (16)
 
1.6 Data
This paper uses quarterly data from the first quarter of 1959 to the third quarter of
2009. The six variables are the real GDP, GDP deflator (implicit price deflator for GDP),
federal funds (effective) rate, consumer-price-index for all urban consumers (all items),
total reserves, and nonborrowed reserves of depository institution, respectively.
The six variables that Bernanke and Mihov (1998) used are the same as the variables
used in this study, except for the fact that Dow--Jones index of spot commodity price was
used instead of consumer price index for all urban consumers (all items).
This study tested 11, 12 and 13 lags for the sample period of first quarter of 1959 to
the fourth quarter of 2007. Both AIC and SBS selected the 13 lags VAR model.
To determine the break point, both the record data and structural break test were
used. Historical record shows that, first of all, Bernanke became chairman of Federal
Reserve Board in 2006. Secondly, sub-prime mortgage crisis became apparent in 2007
and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defines that sub-prime mortgage
crisis started at the end of December, 2007. Last but not least, nonborrowed reserves
became negative in 2008 and the global financial crisis came to the forefront of the
business world in September, 2008. From structural break tests, multiple structural change
tests for nonborrowed reserves were performed. The result shows it is a partial structural
change model with one break. From the graph (figure1.1) we can see that the break point
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should be somewhere around 2007. Everything being considered, 2007 was used as the
break point.
1.7 Estimation and implications
The Semi-VAR methodology was applied for all the five models to test 1965-1996,
1965-2007 and 1965-2009 sample periods, respectively. The five models were introduced
earlier in section 1.5. They are federal funds rate model (FFR), nonborrowed reserves
model (NBR), orthogonalized nonborrowed reserves (NBR/TR), borrowed reserves
model (BR) and just identified model (JI) respectively.
1.7.1 Estimation results
Table 1.1: Parameter Estimates for period 1965-1996 Models (Quarterly)
Model α β ϕd ϕb
FFR -0.002075740
(0.001350056)
0.000943342
(0.001115339)
1 -1
NBR -0.000018322
(0.000117240)
0.000165403
(0.000668353)
0 0
NBR/TR 0 0.001216
(0.000000)
1.968312
(0.000000)
[0.00000000]
0
BR -0.0853
(7.4809e-10)
0.1305
(6.9358e-10)
1 α/β
JI 0 -0.000932783
(0.000287298)
-0.254107725
(0.107767995)
[ 0.01837792]
-0.787284961
(0.037088054)
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Table 1.2: Parameter Estimates for period 1965-2007 Models (Quarterly)
Model α β ϕd ϕb
FFR -0.0002
(0.0006)
0.0005
(0.001)
1 -1
NBR -0.0009
(0.0008)
0.0001
(0.0006)
0 0
NBR/TR 0 -0.0008
(0.0005)
-0.05
(0.083)
0
BR 0.0003
(0.0004)
-0.0006
(0.0007)
1 α/β
JI 0 -0.0006
(0.0002)
-0.152
(0.043)
-0.73
(0.033)
Table 1.3: Parameter Estimates for period 1965-2009 Models (Quarterly)
Model α β ϕd ϕb
FFR -0.05
(0.002)
-0.0005
(0.0002)
1 -1
NBR -0.006
(0.001)
-0.012
(0.002)
0 0
NBR/TR 0 -0.046
(0.005)
3.042
(0.132)
0
BR -0.030
(0.002)
0.030
(0.002)
1 α/β
JI 0 -0.151
(0.0002)
0.480
(0.432)
-3.01
(1.79)
The data in bold indicates that the coefficients are significantly different from zero
(P value < 0.05). ϕd is the coefficient that describes the Fedederal Reserve's tendency to
accommodate reserve demand shocks. We can get the estimates of ϕd from the third model
and the last model. In the sample period between 1965 and 1996, this coefficient is
estimated to be 1.968312 and -0.2541 respectively. But the 1.968312 has a higher
statistical significance level, implying over accommodation of reserves demand shocks
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( 1dφ = ). This estimation outcome contradicts the nonborrowed reserves (NBR) model,
which assumes that 0dφ = . In consequence, the nonborrowed reserve (NBR) model is
strongly rejected in this sample period. (See table 1.1)
During the sample period between 1965 and 2009, ϕd is estimated to be 3.042 and
0.480. Because 0.480 is not significantly different from zero, it is ignored. 3.042 indicates
Federal Reserve's over-accommodation of reserve demand shocks, which implies that the
nonborrowed reserve (NBR) model is strongly rejected. (See table 1.3)
In Bernanke and Mihov’s study (1998), they found that the only period that accepts
the nonborrowed reserve model is during 1979 and 1982.This result is very interesting
because 1979-1982 was the only period in which the Federal Reserve told the public that
it used a nonborrowed reserves as monetary instrument. This result supports Bernanke
and Mihov’s (1995) semi-VAR approach.
ϕb describes the strength of the Fed offsetting the demand for borrowed reserves
shocks. This coefficient is estimated to be negative in almost all cases. The estimate of the
sample period1965-1996 under the JI model is -0.787. During the period between1965
and 2009, this coefficient is estimated to -3.01. The estimate of the period1965-2007
estimate under the JI model is -0.73. This result coincides with the federal funds rate
model.
α were often estimated to be a small negative number. Moreover, the estimations of
β were almost always positive just as predicted.
1.7.2 First important implication
To sum up, ϕd is found to be greater than 1 most of the time, indicating that the
nonborrowed reserve NBR model is strongly rejected. ϕb is always found to be negative
and often close to -1, implying that federal funds rate (FFR) model is accepted. In
conclusion, the federal funds rate model is strongly selected by the semi-VAR approach
for all the sample periods. In other words, the Federal Reserve is still targeting the federal
funds rate just as it claimed.
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1.7.3 Second important implication
Comparing the estimation results of the sample period 1965-2007 (Table 1.2) with
that of the sample period 1965-2009 (Table 1.3) , the coefficients significantly different
from zero estimated for period 1965-2009 tend to be not significantly different from zero
for period 1965-2007, which suggests the parameter changed dramatically by simply
adding two more years' worth of data (2008 and 2009). This further supports that 2007 is
very likely to be a break point, which reconciles the historic record.
1.8 Indications of impulse responses to monetary policy shocks
This paper ran the impulse responses to see how the macro economic variables
responded to the monetary policy shocks. It updated the sample period of earlier studies
to include data up to 2009. It has found that the indications of monetary policy are not
always clear.4 This finding supports the hypothesis that the incorrect nonborrowed
reserve is at least one of the contributing factors to the unclear indications of monetary
policy. During the recent financial crisis, much data became abnormal: total reserves were
expanded by a large amount; TAF borrowing was included in the borrowed reserves but
not included in the total reserves; real GDP shrunk, all of which might contribute to the
unclear indications of monetary policy.
First of all, impulse responses of GDP to federal funds rate shock was tested in the
federal funds rate model for the periods of 1965-1996, 1965-2007 and 1965-2009
respectively. The impulse response (Figure 1.2 and 1.3) is normal for the first two sample
periods, but when adding the data of 2008 and 2009, the result (Figure 1.4) was not
satisfactory.
4 It is because that impulse response of real GDP to monetary policy shocks becomes abnormal. See both
figure (1.4) and figure (1.7)
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Then, the impulse response of GDP to nonborrowed reserve shocks was checked in
the nonborrowed reserve model for the time frame of 1965-1996, 1965-2007 and 1965-
2009 respectively, similar result was obtained (Figure 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7), the impulse
response (Figure 1.5 and 1.6) is normal for the first two sample periods, but when adding
the data of 2008 and 2009, the result (Figure 1.7) was not satisfactory.
What factors were there that contributed to the abnormal impulse response to policy
shocks? During the recent financial crisis, much data became unusual. Among all six time
series data (real GDP, GDP deflator, CPI, federal funds rate, total reserves and
nonborrowed reserves) used in this paper, real GDP, federal funds rate, total reserves and
nonborrowed reserves were obviously unusual during this period of time. Please see
figure 1.10 through figure 1.14 for their graphs. Real GDP went down during the recent
financial crisis, but it was not the first time in the U.S. history. Federal funds rate became
close to zero, which was never happened before. Total reserves were largely expanded by
the Federal Reserve. Moreover, nonborrowed reserves became inappropriate. All of the
above factors may contribute to the abnormal impulse response to policy shocks, which
implied an unclear indication of monetary policy. However, the Federal Reserve can
prevent one data from being calculated wrong, that is, nonborrowed reserves data.
This paper will correct the nonborrowed reserve data. There are two ideal ways to
correct the data. One way is to include TAF borrowing data in both total reserves and
borrowed reserves; the other way is to exclude TAF borrowing data from both of them. I
expect that the correct data will result in smoothing the impulse response or making the
impulse response less volatile.
1.9 Ways to correct the wrong calculation and implications
1.9.1 Two ideal ways
There are two ideal ways to correct the nonborrowed reserve data, which was the
only data that was calculated wrong among all six variables, although real GDP, federal
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funds rate and total reserves also became unusual during the recent financial crisis. One
way is to include TAF borrowing data in both total reserves and borrowed reserves, the
other way is to exclude TAF borrowing data from both of them. However, both of these
methods are not practical except for gathering further information, since there is no way
to know which part of TAF borrowings was included in total reserves and which part was
not. For example, on November 1st, 2008, total reserve was $ 609.939 billion. Discount
window borrowing was $ 305.698 billion. TAF borrowing was $ 393.088 billion.
Nonborrowed reserves were $ -88.8473 billion. Clearly, not all TAF borrowing was
included in total reserves; otherwise, nonborrowed reserve would be a nonnegative
number. We cannot tell from these data exactly how much TAF borrowing exactly was
included in total reserves.
Is it possible that none of the borrowing was included in total reserves? If this is the
case, we can simply ignore the TAF borrowing data and use the old method of calculating
nonborrowed reserve, that is, nonborrowed reserve is equal to total reserve minus
discount window borrowing and run the impulse response. However, the Federal
Reserve's data was totally out of control at that time, since even discount window
borrowing exceeded total reserves in both September and October of 2008.
1.9.2 Alternative and practical ways
Not only did total borrowings (borrowing at the discount window + TAF borrowing)
exceed total reserves, but even discount window borrowing exceeded total reserves in
both September and October of 2008. (Please see the table 1.4 below.) The Federal
Reserve should have opened a new account for the excess borrowing rather than simply
including the excess borrowing in the discount window borrowing. Perhaps these data
contributed to the abnormal response to policy shocks. One way to verify it is to ignore
the data of September and October of 2008, since there is no way at all to fix it at this
point with discount window borrowing exceeding total reserves. However, the impulse
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responses of GDP to shocks in both federal funds rate and nonborrowed reserve models
are not satisfactory. Please see figure 1.15 and figure 1.18.
The reason for the failure of new impulse responses is when the data was ignored,
even one period of data, the balance of the whole economic system was destroyed. Let's
recall our model. Macroeconomic variables Y depend on current and 13 lagged values of
macroeconomic variables and on 13 lagged values of policy indicators. At the same time,
the policy variables depend on both current and 13 lagged values of policy variables and
macroeconomic variables. In other words, all six variables have complicated relationships
with each other up to 13 lagged periods. If any period data was ignored, the relationships
were destroyed, which explained the unsatisfactory impulse response.
I ignored all the negative nonborrowed reserves and ran the impulse response once
again. It turns out that the impulse responses of GDP to shocks in both federal funds rate
and nonborrowed reserve model are unsatisfactory (Please see figure 1.16 and figure
1.19), actually even more volatile than simply ignoring two periods' data (See figure 1.17
and figure 1.20), which was just as expected. The economic system created to model the
real world crashes by missing more data.
Table 1.4: Examples of discount window borrowing exceeding total reserves (Billions of
dollars)
Date Total
reserves
Discount
window
borrowing
TAF borrowing Total borrowing
(Discount
window
borrowing+TAF
borrowing)
Non-borrowed
reserves
2008-09-
01 102.767 140.291 149.814 290.105 -187.338
2008-10-
01 315.498 403.541 244.778 648.319 -332.821
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1.9.3 Gathering more data in future research
In future research, more data is needed because the most recent data is still abnormal.
For example, the Federal Reserve just made their decision in August, 2011 to keep the
federal funds rate at a low level for several years to fight the stalling economy. It seems
that we have to wait for a while until the economy is back to normal as well as economic
data.
1.10 Conclusions
Federal funds rate is found to be the best indicator of monetary policy, which is also
claimed to be the monetary policy targeting instrument by the Federal Reserve. The semi-
structural VAR model used in this paper was also applied by Bernanke and Mihov
(1998), who successfully found that during 1979 to1982, the nonborrowed reserve model
was strongly accepted. This period overlaps Volcker’s experimental nonborrowed reserve
targeting period exactly, which showed the robustness of the semi-structural VAR model.
Comparing the estimation results of the sample period 1965-2007 (Table 1.2) with
that of the sample period 1965-2009 (Table 1.3) , the coefficients significantly different
from zero estimated for period 1965-2009 tend to be not significantly different from zero
for period 1965-2007, which suggests the parameter changed dramatically from simply
adding two more years data (2008 and 2009). This further supports that 2007 is very
likely to be a break point, which is consistent with the fact that the financial crisis started
in the same year.
This paper tried to correct the nonborrowed reserve data, but unfortunately there is
no way to fix it in an ideal way (See 1.9.1. Two ideal ways) at this point due to the lack of
data. If the data can be fixed, it is expected the corrected nonborrowed reserve data will
result in smoothing the impulse response or making the impulse response less volatile.
Since the two ideal ways to correct data are not at all practical, this paper tried to fix
the nonborrowed reserve data when discount window borrowing exceeded total reserves. I
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found not only total borrowing (borrowing at the discount window + TAF borrowing)
exceeded total reserves, but even discount window borrowing exceeded total reserves in
both September and October of 2008. The only way I can think of is to ignore the data of
September and October of 2008, since there is no way to fix it at this point with discount
window borrowing exceeding total reserves. However, the impulse responses of GDP to
shocks in both federal funds rate and nonborrowed reserves models are not satisfactory
either. (Please see figure 1.15 and figure 1.18.)
Furthermore, I ignored all the negative nonborrowed reserve and ran the impulse
response once again. It turns out that the impulse responses of GDP to shocks in both
federal funds rate and nonborrowed reserve models are unsatisfactory (Please see figure
1.16 and figure 1.19.), actually even more volatile than simply ignoring two periods' data
(See figure 1.17 and figure 1.20), which was just as expected. The economic system
created to model the real world crashes by missing more data.
The experiments I did for fixing the nonborrowed reserve data were not successful.
The reason for the failure of new impulse responses is when the data was ignored, even
two periods of data, the balance of the whole economic system was destroyed. Let's recall
our model. Macroeconomic variables Y depend on current and 13 lagged values of
macroeconomic variables and on 13 lagged values of policy indicators. At the same time,
the policy variables depend on both current and 13 lagged values of policy variables and
macroeconomic variables. In other words, all six variables have complicated relationships
with each other up to 13 lagged periods. If any period data was ignored, the relationships
were destroyed, which explained the unsatisfactory impulse response.
The failure of these two experiments further showed the robustness of this semi-
structural VAR model. In this well-structured semi-structural model: bad data (Fed's
wrong nonborrowed reserves) never works as well as good data; doctored data
(Experiments of ignoring two periods' data and ignoring all negative nonborrowed reserve
data) never works as well as real data.
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Last but not least, the abnormal impulse responses to monetary shocks showed that
the Federal Reserve is at least one of the reasons for the unclear indications of monetary
policy. This will become an additional support for Barnett's proposal (2012) of creating
the Federal Reserve's own data bureau. During the recent financial crisis, much data went
abnormal. Total reserves were expanded by a large amount (See Figure 1.14). From Jan.1,
2008, the nonborrowed reserves of U.S. banks became negative and increased to as large as
486 billion in June, 2009 (figure1.1), since part of the TAF borrowing was included in the
borrowed reserves but not included in the total reserves. Real GDP shrunk (See Figure
1.10) and federal funds rate went to almost zero (See Figure 1.13), all of which might
have contributed to the unclear indications of monetary policy.
A caveat to the findings is that, because of my focus on the importance of recent
changes, I was unavoidably left with short sample periods. It’s impossible to do semi-
structural VAR on only 2008 and 2009 data (quarterly), because 13 lags were picked by
both AIC and SBC. In this case, the sample period 1965 to 2007 was used to compare
with the one from 1965 to 2009.
25
Figure 1.1: Nonborrowed Reserves (in millions of dollars)
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Figure 1.2 : Impulse responses of GDP to expansionary monetary policy shocks in FF
model: negative shock in federal funds rates (1965-1996)
Figure 1.3: Impulse responses of GDP to expansionary monetary policy shocks in FF
model: negative shock in federal funds rates (1965-2007)
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Figure 1.4: Impulse responses of GDP to expansionary monetary policy shocks in FF
model: negative shock in federal funds rates (1965-2009)
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Figure 1.5: Impulse responses of GDP to shocks in NB model: positive shock in
nonborrowed reserve (1965-1996)
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Figure 1.6: Impulse responses of GDP to shocks in NB model: positive shock in
nonborrowed reserve (1965-2007)
Figure 1.7: Impulse responses of GDP to shocks in NB model: positive shock in
nonborrowed reserve (1965-2009)
Figure 1.8: The calculation of total reserves on November 1st, 2007
Figure 1.8: The calculation of total reserves on November 1st, 2007
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Figure 1.8: The calculation of total reserves on November 1st, 2007
Discount Window 
borrowings
Non-borrowed 
Reserves
Total  reserves=Borrowed reserves+Non_borrowed reserves
30
Figure 1.9: An example of recent accounting method for non-borrowed reserves5
5 Total borrowings = Discount window borrowing + TAF borrowing.
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Figure 1.10: GDP (1959-2009) Units: billions
G DP
0.000
2000.000
4000.000
6000.000
8000.000
10000.000
12000.000
14000.000
16000.000
J
a
n
-5
9
J
a
n
-6
2
J
a
n
-6
5
J
a
n
-6
8
J
a
n
-7
1
J
a
n
-7
4
J
a
n
-7
7
J
a
n
-8
0
J
a
n
-8
3
J
a
n
-8
6
J
a
n
-8
9
J
a
n
-9
2
J
a
n
-9
5
J
a
n
-9
8
J
a
n
-0
1
J
a
n
-0
4
J
a
n
-0
7
G DP
32
Figure 1.11: GDP deflator (1959-2009) Units: Index 2005=100
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Figure 1.12: CPI (1959-2009) Units: Index 1982-84=100
CPI
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Figure 1.13: Federal funds rate (1959-2009) Units: percentage
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Figure 1.14: Total reserves (1959-2009) Units: billions
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Figure 1.15: The comparison of two impulse responses in FF model: negative shock in
federal funds rate (One has adjusted data.)
Figure 1.16: The comparison of two impulse responses in FF model: negative shock in
federal funds rates (One has adjusted data.)
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Figure 1.17: The comparison of two adjusted impulse responses in FF model: negative
shock in federal funds rates
Figure 1.18: The comparison of two impulse responses in NB: positive shock in
nonborrowed reserve (One has adjusted data.)
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Figure 1.19: The comparison of two impulse responses in NB model: positive shock in
nonborrowed reserve (One has adjusted data.)
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Figure 1.20: The comparison of two adjusted impulse responses in NB model:
positive shock in nonborrowed reserve
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2 Chapter 2: Do repurchase agreement rates contain more information
for monetary policy than Treasury bill rates?
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to test whether repurchase agreement rates (repo rates) contain
more information for monetary policy than Treasury bill rates during the recent two
decades. First of all, this paper finds evidence that by using 3-month repo rates for
forecasting federal funds rates, expectation theory performs extremely well. Previous
researchers often rejected expectation theory by using Treasury bill rates. Secondly, the
first result motivated my further research on comparing the abilities of repo rates with
Treasury bill rates for forecasting federal funds rates. Last but not least, this article will
test and compare the forecasting ability of the government, agency and mortgage repo
rates and explore whether any of these three repo rates can be considered as a better
riskless rate than Treasury bill rates. Although the Treasury bill rate is often applied as the
riskless rate, the people in the Wall Street believed that it is biased from the riskless rate.
More specifically, Treasury bill rates should be lower than riskless rates, since it has
special advantages such as tax advantages.
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2.1 Motivation and Literature Review
Researchers have done a considerable amount of research on the expectation ability
of the Treasury bill rate. A lot of them believe that the Treasury bill rate contains
information about both the economy and monetary policy. However, few of them are
interested in exploring repo rates. This paper tried to fill this gap.
Why are repo rates neglected most of the time? On one hand, repo rates are not
publicly available, while Treasury bill rates are easy and free to get. The only source to
get repo rates data so far as I know is the Bloomberg system, which is neither free nor
even cheap. This might have prevented researchers from exploring the repo rates. On the
other hand, researchers are getting used to exploring Treasury bill rates and neglecting the
repo rates. For example, Bernanke (1990) found the spread between the commercial paper
rate and the Treasury bill rate is the best indicator for the economy among interest rates,
but he never checked repo rate. Kauppi (2007) found the spread between the 6-month
Treasury bill rate and federal funds rate is one of the best predictors for the future federal
funds rate. However, repo rate has again been neglected.
Repurchase agreement is the first widely used money market instrument, while the
Treasury bill only ranks fifth overall6. Why does the ranking matter? The more widely
used the instrument, the more efficient its rates might be. A most efficient money market
rate captures the most information from the economy and in return, might be a best
indicator for the market. Furthermore, Longstaff (2000) found more evidence for this,
since the expectation hypothesis is found to be unbiased by using repo rates instead of
Treasury bill rates.
6 See Kamath, Khaksari, Meier, and Winklepleck (1985).
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Simon (1990) tested the predictive power of the spread between the 3-month
Treasury bill rate and federal funds rate for the future federal funds rate and found the
predictive power is not the same for forecasting the federal funds rate during different
monetary policy regimes. The spread has most significant predictive power during the
nonborrowed reserves operating regime, while it has less predictive power during the
borrowed reserves regime and no predictive power during the federal funds rate targeting
regime.
Longstaff (2000) has done an empirical study to support the expectations hypothesis,
which was often rejected by many researchers. By testing the very short end of the term
structure such as overnight, weekly, and monthly repo rates for forecasting the federal
funds rate, his paper found the expectations hypothesis works very well. Furthermore, the
author found the term premium in repo rates are zero except for the weekly repo rates
case, which is exactly consistent with the pure form of the expectations hypothesis, which
says that long-term rates can be represented as current and future short-term interest rate
over the horizon of the long-term securities. Term premium is also called "liquidity
premium". This premium compensates investors for the more risk of holding longer term
securities, since there is higher price uncertainty existing in the longer term securities.
Therefore, people prefer short term securities to long term securities and require higher
return from the longer term securities.
Furthermore, Longstaff (2000) pointed out that the repo rates may be better riskless
rates. He has mentioned in his paper that the Wall Street thought the Treasury bill rates
were poor measures of the riskless rate, since they are not only safe but also very liquid.
As a result, the Treasury bill rate should be lower than the riskless rate.
Nosal (2001) concluded that the federal funds futures rate does contain information
about the future federal funds rate. However, one must make appropriate adjustments to
take account of the biases and past movements of the federal funds rate. In other words,
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the federal funds futures rate does not provide the market with accurate estimates of the
future federal funds rate at a specific point in time.
2.2 The Model
The model is based on rational expectation theory. Rational expectation theory says
long-term rates can be represented as current and future short-term interest rates over the
horizon of the long-term securities, plus a risk premium.
The repo rate might be a better measurement for the risk free rate than the Treasury
bill rate. There are many reasons to support this point of view: First of all, repurchase
agreements, especially general collateral government repurchase agreement and agency
repurchase agreement are very safe money market instruments. When a company, which
is considered as a seller, borrows by using a repurchase agreement, it has to provide
collateral simultaneously. Later it will buy back the collaterals at a higher price. The
difference between the original price and the new price can be represented as interest rates,
known as repo rates. There are several different forms of collateral that the company can
provide, which depend on what kind of repurchase agreement that this company plans to
use. For example, there are general collateral government repurchase agreements, agency
repurchase agreements and mortgage repurchase agreements. If the company decides to
use a general collateral government repurchase agreement, then it will provide the lender
or buyer with government securities. It is very safe for the lender. If the borrower or seller
cannot pay the money back, the lender can simply sell the government securities instead.
Secondly, repurchase agreements do not have the special advantages of Treasury bills,
such as tax advantage. The interest earned from purchasing the Treasury bill will be
exempt from state and local income taxes. That is why the Treasury bill rate is biased from
the true risk free rate. More specifically, it is lower than the true risk free rate. Thirdly, the
repo rate market is the most widely used, thus it is the most efficient market. To sum up,
the repurchase agreement is both a safe, and efficient money market instrument without
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the special advantages of the Treasury bill. Therefore, the repo rate might be a better risk
free rate than the Treasury bill rate.
This paper will apply the rational expectations theory by using repurchase
agreements and Treasury bills as long-term securities, and the federal funds rate as the
short-term rate. The purpose of this paper is not to find the best way to predict the federal
funds rate, but to test whether the repo rate carry more information than the Treasury bill
rate. Furthermore, this paper also will use various repo rates and Treasury bill rates as risk
free rates and test whether the repo rate is a better measurement of the riskless rate.
Equation (1) represents the rational expectation theory: The 3-month repo rate is
equal to the average of the current and the future federal funds rates over the 91 days to
maturity, minus a risk premium and a constant. tRRA is the 3-month repurchase
agreement rate. tRFF and ( )+t t iE RFF are the effective federal funds rate and the expected
future overnight federal funds rates, respectively, and tREURO is the 3-month eurodollar
rate. The risk premium has a negative sign because federal funds are more risky than
repurchase agreements as money market instruments. Furthermore, at a risky time, the
market will fly to safety. In this case, the market will demand more repurchase
agreements, since it is fully collaterized and thus risk free. At the same time, the market
will demand less federal funds. As a result, the repo rates go up and federal funds rates go
down, and the spread between them narrows. The constant is also a risk premium but at a
non-time-varying term.
tRRA = - φ + ( tRFF /91) +
90
1
( / 91)+
=
∑t t i
i
E RFF - θ ( tREURO - tRRA ). (1)
Equation (2) is derived by simply rearranging equation (1)
90
1
( / 90)t t i
i
E RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= (91/90) φ + 91/90( tRRA - tRFF ) + (91/90) θ ( tREURO - tRRA ). (2)
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In equation (3), the average of the effective federal funds rate is expressed as the
average of the expected average repurchase agreement rate plus an error:
90
1
( ) / 90+
=
∑ t i
i
RFF =
90
1
( / 90)+
=
∑t t i
i
E RFF + +µt i (3)
I derived equation (4) simply by substituting equation (3) into equation (2), where
0b = (91/90) φ , 1b =91/90, and 2b = (91/90) θ .
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( tRRA - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tRRA ) + +µt i . (4)
It is expected that estimates of b1 should be close to 1 if the rational expectation
theory performs well. b2 should be positive since investors require more compensation to
hold federal funds than repurchase agreements, because federal funds are more risky than
repurchase agreements. If a company borrows money from the federal funds market, it
does not need to provide any collateral. While borrowing through the repurchase
agreement market, it has to provide a collateral.
If the 3-month repo rate is replaced by the overnight repo rate, then equation (4)
takes the form of:
tRFF = tRRA + φ + θ ( tREURO - tRRA ) (5)
Similarly, if the 3-month repo rate is replaced by 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 1-month,
and 2-month repo rates respectively, then equation (4) takes the form of (6) – (10)
respectively:
46
6
1
( ) / 6t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF = (7/6) φ + (7/6) ( tRRA - tRFF ) + (7/6) θ ( tREURO - tRRA )
+ +µt i (6)
13
1
( ) /13t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF = (14/13) φ + (14/13) ( tRRA - tRFF )
+ (14/13) θ ( tREURO - tRRA ) + +µt i (7)
20
1
( ) / 20t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF = (21/20) φ + (21/20) ( tRRA - tRFF )
+ (21/20) θ ( tREURO - tRRA ) + t i+µ (8)
30
1
( ) / 30t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF = (31/30) φ + (31/30) ( tRRA - tRFF )
+ (31/30) θ ( tREURO - tRRA ) + +µt i (9)
60
1
( ) / 60t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF = (61/60) φ + (61/60) ( tRRA - tRFF )
+ (61/60) θ ( tREURO - tRRA ) + +µt i (10)
This paper aims to compare the predictability of Treasury bill rates to that of various
repo rates with different maturities, so I replace 3-month repo rates with 3-month
Treasury bill rates in equation (4):
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( tTB - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tTB ) + +µt i . (11)
2.3 Data
The data of my study consists of daily observations of the 1-month and 3-month
general collateral government repo rates, agency repo rates and mortgage repo rates. The
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period covered by the study is from May 21, 1991 to February 10, 2011. Repo rates data is
neither publicly available nor free. The only source that provides this data is the
Bloomberg system, so far as I know.
The federal funds rate, 1-month Treasury bill rate, 3-month Treasury bill rate, 1-
month eurodollar rate and 3-month eurodollar rate are from the Federal Reserve database.
Government repo, agency repo, mortgage repo, federal funds, Treasury bill and
eurodollar rates are denoted as tRRAG , tRRAA , tRRAM , tRFF , tTB and tREURO ,
respectively.
The Treasury bill rate has its data limitation in maturity. It does not have shorter-
term maturity, which makes it of limited use to test the expectations hypothesis.
Because of heteroskedasticity, this paper will use General Least Squares (GLS)
regression.
This paper will run the GLS on the following equations:
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( tTB - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tTB ) + +µt i . (12)
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( tRRAM - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tRRAM ) + +µt i .
(13)
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( tRRAA - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tRRAA ) + +µt i .
(14)
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
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= 0b + 1b ( tRRAG - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tRRAG ) + +µt i .
(15)
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( tRRAM - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tRRAG ) + +µt i .
(16)
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( tRRAA - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tRRAG ) + +µt i .
(17)
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( tRRAG - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tTB ) + +µt i . (18)
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( tRRAM - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tTB ) + +µt i . (19)
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( tRRAA - tRFF ) + 2b ( tREURO - tTB ) + +µt i . (20)
In the process of collecting repo rate data, I found that with the same maturity date,
the mortgage repo rate is higher than the government repo rate, followed by the agency
repo rate. The agency repo rate is the lowest, since it is the safest one. (Mortgage repo rate
> Government repo rate > Agency repo rate)
2.4 Estimation Results
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This section showed estimation results of repo rates and Treasury bill rates with
different maturities at various sample periods. The main purpose of this part is to see how
well the expectation theory works by applying different experiments. The most important
finding of this section is that expectation theory works extremely well by using 3-month
repo rates for forecasting federal funds rates rather than Treasury bill rates during the
years 2001 through 2006.
2.4.1 First Result (1991-2011) -- expectation performances of 3-month repo rates and 3-
month Treasury bill rates
Table 2.1: Summary of expectation performance of 3-month repo rates and 3-month
Treasury bill rates (1991-2011)
** = statistical significance (p < 0.05)
Firstly, this paper tests the forecasting ability of the 3-month Treasury bill rate,
mortgage repo rate, agency repo rate, and government repo rate by using their respective
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rates as risk free rates, and finds that 3-month repo rates are less predictive than 3-month
Treasury bill rates. Please see tables 2.5 through 2.8, which correspond to equations 12
through 15. This result contradicts Longstaff's (2000) finding. Furthermore, the agency
repo rate has more predictive power for the federal funds rate than both the government
repo rate and mortgage repo rate.
Secondly, by using the government repo rate as riskless rate to test the forecasting
ability of mortgage repo, agency repo, and government repo rates, the 3-month repo rate
is less predictive than the 3-month Treasury bill rate. Please see table 2.5 and tables 2.8
through 2.10, which correspond to equation 12 and equations 15 through 17. Moreover,
the government repo rate and mortgage repo rate have slightly better predictive power
than the agency repo rate.
Thirdly, by using the 3-month Treasury bill rate as riskless rate to test the forecasting
ability of Treasury bill, mortgage repo, agency repo, and government repo rates, the 3-
month repo rate is less predictive than the 3-month Treasury bill rate. Please see table 2.5
and tables 2.11 through 2.13, corresponding to equation 12 and equations 18 through 20.
The mortgage repo rate has slightly better predictive power than the other two rates.
Above all, the 3-month repo rates contain less predictive power for forecasting the
federal funds rate than the 3-month Treasury bill rate. This result contradicts Longstaff's
(2000) finding. Mortgage repo, agency repo and government repo rates have the most
predictive power when using their respective rates as risk free rates. (For example, the
mortgage repo rate has the most predictive power when using mortgage repo rates rather
than other repo rates as riskless rates.) Under this circumstance, the agency repo rate has
much more predictive power for the federal funds rate than both the government repo rate
and mortgage repo rate.
2.4.2 Second Result (2001-2011) -- expectation performances of 1-month repo rates and
1-month Treasury bill rates
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This paper tried shorter-term, 1-month repo rates and applied the expectation theory
again. Since the earliest 1-month Treasury bill rate data published on the Federal Reserve
website is July, 31, 2001, this paper will cover the period from then until 2011.
If the 3-month repo rate " tRRA " is replaced by the 1-month repo rate " 1tRRA ", and
the 3-month euro dollar rate " tREURO " is replaced by the 1-month euro dollar rate
" 1tREURO ", then equation (1) changes into:
1tRRA = - φ + ( tRFF /31) +
30
1
( / 31)t t i
i
E RFF +
=
∑ - θ ( 1tREURO - 1tRRA ). (1)'
Equation (2)' is derived by simply rearranging equation (1)'
30
1
( / 30) (31/ 30) 31/ 30( 1 ) (31/ 30) ( 1 )t t i t t t t
i
E RFF RFF RRA RFF RRA+
=
− = Φ + − + Θ∑ (2)'
In equation (3)', the average federal funds rate is equal to the average of the expected
average repurchase agreement rate plus an error:
30
1
( ) / 30t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ =
30
1
( / 30)t t i
i
E RFF +
=
∑ + +µt i (3)'
I derived equation (4)' simply by substituting equation (3)' into equation (2)', where
0b = (31/30) φ , 1b =31/30, and 2b = (31/30) θ .
30
1
( ) / 30t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( 1tRRA - tRFF ) + 2b ( 1tREURO - 1tRRA ) + +µt i . (4)'
This paper will further run GLS on the following equations:
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30
1
( ) / 30t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( 1tTB - tRFF ) + 2b ( 1tREURO - 1tTB ) + +µt i . (12)'
30
1
( ) / 30t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
= 0b + 1b ( 1tRRAM - tRFF ) + 2b ( 1tREURO - 1tRRAM ) + +µt i . (13)'
30
1
( ) / 30t i
i
RFF +
=
∑ - tRFF
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Table 2.2: Summary of expectation performances of 1-month repo rates and 1-month
Treasury bill rates (2001-2011)
** = statistical significance (p < 0.05)
First of all, this paper tests the forecasting ability of the 1-month Treasury bill rate,
mortgage repo rate, agency repo rate, and government repo rate by using their respective
rates as risk free rates, and finds that the 1-month repo rate is less predictive than the 1-
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month Treasury bill rate. Please see tables 2.14 through 2.17, which correspond to
equations (12)' through (15)'. This result contradicts Longstaff's (2000) finding.
Furthermore, the government repo rate and mortgage repo rate have slightly more
predictive power for the federal funds rate than the agency repo rate.
Next, by using the 1-month government repo rate as the risk free rate to test the
forecasting ability of the 1-month mortgage repo, agency repo, and government repo
rates, this paper did not find evidence that the 1-month repo rate is more predictive than
the 1-month Treasury bill rate. Please see table 2.14 and tables 2.17 through 2.19, which
correspond to equation (12)' and equations (15)' through (17)'. Moreover, the mortgage
repo rate has slightly better predictive power than both the government repo rate and
agency repo rate.
Finally, by using the 1-month Treasury bill rate as riskless rate to test the forecasting
ability of 1-month Treasury bill, mortgage repo, agency repo, and government repo rates,
this paper found evidence that the 1-month repo rate is less predictive than the 1- month
Treasury bill rate. Please see table 2.14 and tables 2.20 through 2.22, corresponding to
equation (12)' and equations (18)' through (20)'. The mortgage repo rate has slightly better
predictive power than the other two rates.
To sum up, the 1-month repo rate contains less predictive power for forecasting the
federal funds rate than the 1-month Treasury bill rate during the years 2001 through 2010.
This result contradicts Longstaff's (2000) finding. 1-month mortgage repo, agency repo
and government repo rates have the most predictive power when using their respective
rates as risk free rates. (For instance, 1-month agency repo rate has more predictive power
when using the agency repo rate as the risk free rate.) Under this circumstance, the
government repo rate and mortgage repo rate have slightly more predictive power for the
federal funds rate than the agency repo rate.
2.4.3 Third Result (2001-2006) -- expectation performances of 1-month repo rates and
1-month Treasury bill rates
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To eliminate the influence of the abnormal data on the expectation performances
during the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis, this paper tried the 1-month repo rate again
for the period from July, 31, 2001 to December, 29, 2006, since the first chapter
concluded that 2007 is a breaking point. The federal funds rate data became abnormal
from this point, it will make the expectation performances of both repo rates and Treasury
bill rates biased.
Table 2.3: Summary of expectation performances of 1-month repo rates and 1-month
Treasury bill rates (2001-2006)
** = statistical significance (p < 0.05)
Firstly, this paper tests the forecasting ability of the Treasury bill rate, and three
types of repo rates by using their respective rates as risk free rates and finds the 1-month
repo rate is less predictive than the 1-month Treasury bill rate. Please see tables 2.23
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through 2.26, which correspond to equations (12)' through (15)'. This result contradicts
Longstaff's (2000) finding. Furthermore, the agency repo rate and mortgage repo rate
have slightly more predictive power for the federal funds rate than the government repo
rate. (The agency repo rate has the best predictive power, the mortgage repo rate has the
second best, followed by the government repo rate.)
Secondly, by using the 1-month government repo rate as the risk free rate to test the
forecasting ability of the 1-month mortgage repo, agency repo, and government repo
rates, this paper found 1-month repo rate is less predictive than 1-month Treasury bill rate.
Please see table 2.23 and tables 2.26 through 2.28, which correspond to equation (12)' and
equations (15)' through (17)'. Moreover, the government repo rate has better predictive
power than both the mortgage repo rate and agency repo rate.
Finally, by using the 1-month Treasury bill rate as riskless rate to test the forecasting
ability of 1-month Treasury bill, mortgage repo, agency repo, and government repo rates,
this paper found that the 1-month repo rate is less predictive than the 1- month Treasury
bill rate. Please see table 2.23 and tables 2.29 through 2.31, corresponding to equation
(12)' and equations (18)' through (20)'. The government repo rate has slightly better
predictive power than the other two rates.
To sum up, the 1-month repo rate contains less predictive power for forecasting the
federal funds rate than the 1-month Treasury bill rate during the years 2001 through 2006.
This result contradicts Longstaff's (2000) finding. However, after ignoring the recent
abnormal data of the federal funds rate, expectation performances of 1-month government
repo, agency repo, and mortgage repo rates are better. 1-month mortgage repo, agency
repo and government repo rates have the most predictive power when using their
respective rates as risk free rates. (For instance, the agency repo rate has more predictive
power when using the agency repo rate as riskless rate.) Under this circumstance, the
agency repo rate and mortgage repo rate have slightly more predictive power for the
federal funds rate than the government repo rate.
57
2.4.4 Fourth Result (2001-2006) -- expectation performances of 3-month repo rates and
3-month Treasury bill rates
From the previous result, we can see that expectation performance of the 1-month
repo rate improved when ignoring abnormal data of the federal funds rate. Then the next
question is whether the expectation performance of 3-month repo rate will also improve
after ignoring those data. This paper tested predictive power of 3-month repo rates from
July, 31, 2001 to December, 29, 2006, the same period covered in the previous section, so
that we can compare which term rates have better predictive power.
Table 2.4: Summary of expectation performances of 3-month repo rates and 3-month
Treasury bill rates (2001-2006)
** = statistical significance (p < 0.05)
First of all, this paper tests the forecasting ability of the 3-month Treasury bill rate,
mortgage repo rate, agency repo rate, and government repo rate by using their respective
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rates as risk free rates, and finds that 3-month repo rates are much more predictive than 3-
month Treasury bill rates. Because the first coefficient on equations 13 through 15 is
close to 1, which means the predictive power of repo rates is extremely strong. Please see
tables 2.32 through 2.35, which correspond to equations (12) through (15). This result is
consistent with Longstaff's (2000) finding. Furthermore, the agency repo rate has the best
predictive power, the mortgage repo rate has the second best, followed by the government
repo rate.
Next, by using the 3-month government repo rate as the risk free rate to test the
forecasting ability of the 3-month mortgage repo, agency repo, and government repo rates,
this paper found 3-month repo rates are more predictive than 3-month Treasury bill rates,
since the first coefficients are more closer to 1 in equations 15 to 17 than in equation 12.
Please see table 2.32 and tables 2.35 through 2.37, which correspond to equation (12) and
equations (15) through (17). Moreover, the government repo rate has better predictive
power than both the mortgage repo rate and the agency repo rate.
Finally, by using the 3-month Treasury bill rate as riskless rate to test the forecasting
ability of 3-month Treasury bill, mortgage repo, agency repo, and government repo rates,
this paper found both 3-month repo and 3-month Treasury bill rates have poor predictive
power. Please see table 2.32 and tables 2.38 through 2.40, corresponding to equation (12)
and equations (18) through (20). The government repo rate has slightly better predictive
power than the other two rates.
To sum up, 3-month agency repo, government repo and mortgage repo rates contain
better predictive power for forecasting federal funds rates than 3-month Treasury bill rates
during the years 2001 through 2006. In fact, repo rates can predict federal funds rate
extremely well. This result is consistent with Longstaff's (2000) finding. Longstaff (2000)
found evidence to support pure expectation hypothesis by using shorter term repo rate. In
other words, long term repo rates can forecast the average future overnight repo rates very
well. After ignoring the recent abnormal data, expectation performances of 3-month repo
rates are much better. 3-month mortgage repo, agency repo and government repo rates
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have the most predictive power when using their respective rates as risk free rates. (For
instance, the agency repo rate has the most predictive power when using the agency repo
rate as riskless rate.) Under this circumstance, the agency repo rate has the best predictive
power, the mortgage repo rate has the second best, followed by the government repo rate.
2.5 Expected daily and future average 90 day federal funds rates
(2001-2006)
From the previous section, this paper found evidence that by using 3-month repo rates
for forecasting federal funds rates, expectation theory works extremely well. This result
motivated my further research on forecasting federal funds rates by using 3-month repo
rates. In this section, both daily federal funds rates and average 90 day federal funds rates
will be estimated from agency repo rates, government repo rates, mortgage repo rates and
Treasury bill rates. The sample period is from years 2001 through 2006.
By rearranging equation (4), we can get equation (21),
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If we want to use 3-month repo rates or Treasury bill rates to forecast future average
90 day federal funds rates, then equation (21) becomes equation (22),
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We can further get expected daily federal funds rates from equation (23),
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The idea of getting expected daily federal funds rates come from the following:
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First of all, this paper will show that if one knows the first three days' numbers, then
it can forecast the next three days' numbers.
By assumption, if one knows any day's number, then it can forecast the average of
the future 3 days' numbers. In other words, any day's number is equal to the average of the
next 3 days numbers. Letters "a" through "f" denote numbers.
Table 2. 55
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8
a b c d e f g h
In day one, we know that "a" is equal to 3. Therefore,
(b+c+d)/3=3 (24)
In day two, we know that "b" is equal to 4. Therefore,
(c+d+e)/3=4 (25)
In day three, we know that "c" is equal to 6. Therefore,
(d+e+f)/3=6 (26)
From Equations (24) through (26),
We can get d = -1, e = 7, f = 12.
Secondly, by similarity, we can show that if one knows the first four days' numbers,
then it can be forecast the next four days' numbers. By assumption, if one knows any
day's number, then it can be forecast the average of the future 4 days' numbers.
In day one, we know that "a" is equal to 3. Therefore,
(b+c+d+e)/4=3 (27)
In day two, we know that "b" is equal to 4. Therefore,
(c+d+e+f)/4=4 (28)
In day three, we know that "c" is equal to 6. Therefore,
(d+e+f+g)/4=6 (29)
In day four, we know that "d" is equal to 8. Therefore,
(e+f+g+h)/4=8 (30)
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From Equations (27) through (30),
We can get e = -2 , f = 4 , g = 14 , h = 16.
Lastly, we can show that if one knows the first 90 days' numbers, then it can be
forecast the next 90 days' numbers. Every time when one knows one more day's number,
it will help to forecast one more day's number further. This paper will apply the
hypothesis that if we have daily 3-month repo rates for 90 days, then we can forecast the
daily future federal funds rates for the next 90 days for the sample period from 2001 to
2006. Then I will compare the forecasting overnight repo rates with the actual repo rates.
2.5.1 Expected federal funds rates from agency repo rates (2001-2006)
In this section, both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates
will be forecasted by using 3-month agency repo rates.The estimated coefficients are b0 =
-0.1271211, b1=0.9844044, b2=0.7834065. All of the estimated coefficients are
significantly different from zero at a 5% significance level. RRA in this section represents
the agency repo rate. REURO is the 3-month Euro dollar rate.
Firstly, this section will use equation (22) to get the expected average 90 day federal
funds rates. Secondly, we will forecast daily federal funds rates by applying equation (23).
Finally, after getting both estimated average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal
funds rates, this section will present three graphs to show the estimation results. (See
figures 2.1 through 2.3)
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Figure 2. 1 Actual and expected average 90 day federal funds rates from 3-month agency
repo rates (2001-2006)
Figure 2. 2 Actual and expected daily federal funds rates from 3-month agency repo rates
(2001-2006)
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Figure 2. 3 Actual daily federal funds rates and expected average 90 day federal funds
rates from 3-month agency repo rates (2001-2006)
These graphs demonstrate that expected future average 90 day federal funds rates are
very close to actual average 90 day federal funds rates. However, expected daily federal
funds rates are far biased from the actual daily federal funds rates.
Furthermore, if the actual daily federal funds rate is above the expected average 90 day
federal funds rate, then it will be dragged down. If the actual daily federal funds rate is
below the expected average 90 day federal funds rate, then it will be pulled up. This is
very meaningful, because expected average 90 day federal funds rates are the estimation
on the future 90 day federal funds rates on average. At any point in time, if the actual
daily federal funds rate is biased from the expected average 90 day federal funds rates,
then it will eventually get back to the expected average level. This works very well
because the expected average 90 day federal funds rates are very close to the actual
average 90 day federal funds rates.
2.5.2 Expected federal funds rates from government repo rates (2001-2006)
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In this section, both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates
will be forecasted by using 3-month government repo rates.The estimated coefficients are
b0 = -.1101518, b1=0.9734084, b2=.7525485. All of the estimated coefficients are
significantly different from zero at a 5% significance level. RRA in this section represents
the government repo rate. REURO is the 3-month Euro dollar rate.
Firstly, this section will use equation (22) to get the expected average 90 day federal
funds rates. Secondly, we will forecast daily federal funds rates by applying equation (23).
Finaly, after getting both estimated average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal
funds rates, this section will present three graphs to show the estimation results. (See
figures 2.4 through 2.6)
Figure 2. 4 Actual and expected average 90 day federal funds rates from 3-month
government repo rates (2001-2006)
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Figure 2. 5 Actual and expected daily federal funds rate from 3-month government repo
rates (2001-2006)
Figure 2. 6 Actual daily federal funds rate and expected average 90 days federal funds
rates from 3-month government repo rates (2001-2006)
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These graphs demonstrate that expected future average 90 day federal funds rates are
very close to actual average 90 day federal funds rates. However, expected daily federal
funds rates are far biased from the actual daily federal funds rates.
Furthermore, if the actual daily federal funds rate is above the expected average 90
days federal funds rate, then it will be dragged down. If the actual daily federal funds rate
is below the expected average 90 days federal funds rate, then it will be pulled up. This is
very meaningful, because expected average 90 day federal funds rates are the estimation
on the future 90 days federal funds rates on average. At any point in time, if the actual
daily federal funds rate is biased from the expected average 90 day federal funds rates,
then it will eventually get back to the expected average level. This works very well
because the expected average 90 day federal funds rates are very close to the actual
average 90 day federal funds rates.
2.5.3 Expected federal funds rates from mortgage repo rates (2001-2006)
In this section, both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates
will be forecasted by using 3-month mortgage repo rates.The estimated coefficients are b0
= -.1264201, b1=9785054, b2=7754894. All of the estimated coefficients are significantly
different from zero at a 5% significance level. RRA in this section represents the
mortgage repo rate. REURO is the 3-month Euro dollar rate.
Firstly, this section will use equation (22) to get the expected average 90 day federal
funds rates. Secondly, we will forecast daily federal funds rates by applying equation (23).
After getting both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates, this
section will present three graphs to show the estimation results. (See figures 2.7 through
2.9)
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Figure 2. 7 Actual and expected average 90 day federal funds rates from 3-month
mortgage repo rates (2001-2006)
Figure 2. 8 Actual and expected daily federal funds rates from 3-month mortgage repo
rates (2001-2006)
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Figure 2. 9 Actual daily federal funds rates and expected average 90 day federal funds
rates from 3-month mortgage repo rates (2001-2006)
These graphs demonstrate that expected future average 90 day federal funds rates are
very close to actual average 90 day federal funds rates. However, expected daily federal
funds rates are far biased from the actual daily federal funds rates.
Furthermore, if the actual daily federal funds rate is above the expected average 90
day federal funds rate, then it will be dragged down. If the actual daily federal funds rate
is below the expected average 90 day federal funds rate, then it will be pulled up. This is
very meaningful, because expected average 90 day federal funds rates are the estimation
on the future 90 day federal funds rates on average. At any point in time, if the actual
daily federal funds rate is biased from the expected average 90 day federal funds rates,
then it will eventually get back to the expected average level. This works very well
because the expected average 90 day federal funds rates are very close to the actual
average 90 day federal funds rates.
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2.5.4 Expected federal funds rates from Treasury bill rates (2001-2006)
In this section, both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates
will be forecasted by using 3-month Treasury bill rates.The estimated coefficients are b0 =
-.1096741, b1=1.505271, b2=1.365926. All of the estimated coefficients are significantly
different from zero at a 5% significance level. RRA in this section represents the Treasury
bill rate. REURO is the 3-month Euro dollar rate.
Firstly, this section will use equation (22) to get the expected average 90 day federal
funds rates. Secondly, we will forecast daily federal funds rates by applying equation (23).
After getting both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates, this
section will present three graphs to show the estimation results. (See figures 2.10 through
2.12)
Figure 2. 10 Actual and expected average 90 day federal funds rates from 3-month
Treasury bill rates (2001-2006)
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Figure 2. 11 Actual and expected daily federal funds rates from 3-month Treasury bill
rates (2001-2006)
Figure 2. 12 Actual daily federal funds rates and expected average 90 day federal funds
rates from 3-month Treasury bill rates (2001-2006)
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The estimated daily federal funds rates are more biased from the actual rates when
using Treasury bill rates instead of repo rates.
From figure 2.10, it seems that the expected average 90 day federal funds rates are
also close to the actual rates by using Treasury bill rates. However, the forecasting ability
of Treasury bill rates is a little bit weaker than that of repo rates. To show this, we need
further exploration.
2.5.5 Comparison of forecasting abilities of three types of repo rates and Treasury bill
rates for monetary policy (2001-2006)
Table 2.49 Comparison of forecasting abilities of three types of repo rates and Treasury
bill rates for monetary policy (2001-2006)
Mean square between
expected average and
actual average 90 day
federal funds rates
Mean square between
expected and actual
daily federal funds
rates
Mean square between
expected average 90
day federal funds
rates and actual daily
federal funds rates
Expected from
Treasury bill rates
0.037676829468 293.93496007 0.10076312952
Expected from agency
repo rates
0.018975715442 154.96575187 0.13999384823
Expected from
government repo rates
0.01816308068 148.68226128 0.14448739344
Expected from
mortgage repo rates
0.018992110672 155.26653184 0.14046837937
Agency, government and mortgage repo rates have much better ability for
forecasting both daily and expected average 90 day federal funds rates than Treasury bill
rates.
The forecasting abilities of agency, government and mortgage repo rates are very
similar. Government repo rates have slightly better forecasting abilities for both daily and
expected average 90 day federal funds rates than do agency and mortgage repo rates
during the sample years 2001 through 2006.
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2.6 Expected daily and future average 90 day federal funds rates (1991-
2006)
From the previous section, this paper found that 3-month agency, government and
mortgage repo rates have a much better ability for forecasting both daily and expected
average 90 day federal funds rates than Treasury bill rates during the sample period from
2001 through 2006. This paper would like to test a longer sample period from 1991
through 2006 and see whether the same results would be obtained. In this section, both
daily federal funds rates and average 90 day federal funds rates will be estimated from 3-
month agency repo rates, government repo rates, mortgage repo rates and Treasury bill
rates.
2.6.1 Expected from agency repo rates (1991-2006)
In this section, both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates
will be forecasted by using 3-month agency repo rates. All of the estimated coefficients
are significantly different from zero at a 5% significance level. RRA in this section
represents the agency repo rate. REURO is the 3-month Euro dollar rate.
Firstly, this section will use equation (22) to get the expected average 90 day federal
funds rates. Secondly, we will forecast daily federal funds rates by applying equation (23).
Finally, after getting both estimated average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal
funds rates, this section will present three graphs to show the estimation results. (See
figures 2.13 through 2.15)
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Figure 2.13 Actual and expected average 90 day federal funds rates from 3-
month agency repo rates (1991-2006)
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Figure 2.14 Actual and expected daily federal funds rates from 3-month agency repo
rates (1991-2006)
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Figure 2.15 Actual daily federal funds rates and expected average 90 day federal
funds rates from 3-month agency repo rates (1991-2006)
These graphs demonstrate that expected future average 90 day federal funds rates are
very close to actual average 90 day federal funds rates. However, expected daily federal
funds rates are far biased from the actual daily federal funds rates. Furthermore, actual
daily federal funds rates are very close to expected average 90 day federal funds rate
during the sample period from 1991 to 2006.
2.6.2 Expected federal funds rates from government repo rates (1991-2006)
In this section, both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates
will be forecasted by using 3-month government repo rates. All of the estimated
coefficients are significantly different from zero at a 5% significance level. RRA in this
section represents the government repo rate. REURO is the 3-month Euro dollar rate.
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Firstly, this section will use equation (22) to get the expected average 90 day federal
funds rates. Secondly, we will forecast daily federal funds rates by applying equation (23).
Finaly, after getting both estimated average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal
funds rates, this section will present three graphs to show the estimation results. (See
figures 2.16 through 2.18)
Figure 2.16 Actual and expected average 90 day federal funds rates from 3-
month government repo rates (1991-2006)
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Figure 2.17 Actual and expected daily federal funds rates from 3-month
government repo rates (1991-2006)
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Figure 2.18 Actual daily federal funds rates and expected average 90 day federal
funds rates from 3-month government repo rates (1991-2006)
These graphs demonstrate that expected future average 90 day federal funds rates are
very close to actual average 90 day federal funds rates. However, expected daily federal
funds rates are far biased from the actual daily federal funds rates. Furthermore, actual
daily federal funds rates are very close to expected average 90 day federal funds rate
during the sample period from 1991 to 2006.
2.6.3 Expected federal funds rates from mortgage repo rates (1991-2006)
In this section, both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates
will be forecasted by using 3-month mortgage repo rates. All of the estimated coefficients
are significantly different from zero at a 5% significance level. RRA in this section
represents the mortgage repo rate. REURO is the 3-month Euro dollar rate.
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Firstly, this section will use equation (22) to get the expected average 90 day federal
funds rates. Secondly, we will forecast daily federal funds rates by applying equation (23).
After getting both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates, this
section will present three graphs to show the estimation results. (See figures 2.19 through
2.21)
Figure 2.19 Actual and expected average 90 day federal funds rates from 3-
month mortgage repo rates (1991-2006)
80
Figure 2.20 Actual and expected daily federal funds rates from 3-month
mortgage repo rates (1991-2006)
Figure 2.21 Actual daily federal funds rates and expected average 90 day federal
funds rates from 3-month mortgage repo rates (1991-2006)
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These graphs demonstrate that expected future average 90 day federal funds rates are
very close to actual average 90 day federal funds rates. However, expected daily federal
funds rates are far biased from the actual daily federal funds rates. Furthermore, actual
daily federal funds rates are very close to expected average 90 day federal funds rate
during the sample period from 1991 to 2006.
2.6.4 Expected from Treasury bill rates (1991-2006)
In this section, both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates
will be forecasted by using 3-month Treasury bill rates. All of the estimated coefficients
are significantly different from zero at a 5% significance level. RRA in this section
represents the Treasury bill rate. REURO is the 3-month Euro dollar rate.
Firstly, this section will use equation (22) to get the expected average 90 day federal
funds rates. Secondly, we will forecast daily federal funds rates by applying equation (23).
After getting both average 90 day federal funds rates and daily federal funds rates, this
section will present three graphs to show the estimation results. (See figures 2.22 through
2.24)
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Figure 2.22 Actual and expected average 90 day federal funds rates from 3-
month Treasury bill rates (1991-2006)
Figure 2.23 Actual and expected daily federal funds rates from 3-month Treasury
bill rates (1991-2006)
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Figure 2.24 Actual daily federal funds rates and expected average 90 day federal
funds rates from 3-month Treasury bill rates (1991-2006)
These graphs demonstrate that expected future average 90 day federal funds rates are
below the actual average 90 day federal funds rates. The expected daily federal funds
rates are far biased from the actual daily federal funds rates. Furthermore, actual daily
federal funds rates are above the expected average 90 day federal funds rate during the
sample period from 1991 to 2006.
2.6.5 Comparison of forecasting abilities of three types of repo rates and Treasury bill
rates for monetary policy (1991-2006)
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Table 2.50 Comparison of forecasting abilities of three types of repo rates and Treasury
bill rates for monetary policy (1991-2006)
Mean square between
expected and actual
average 90 day federal
funds rates
Mean square between
expected and actual
daily federal funds rates
Mean square between
expected average 90
day federal funds rates
and actual daily federal
funds rates
Expected from Treasury
bill rates
0.45094584969 3608.5945711 0.49965135068
Expected from agency
repo rates
0.029662844679 236.73407341 0.11051199552
Expected from
government repo rates
0.028686136325 229.4899296 0.11456172924
Expected from
mortgage repo rates
0.029556223786 236.01704806 0.11198864207
Agency, government and mortgage repo rates have much better ability for
forecasting both daily and expected average 90 day federal funds rates than Treasury bill
rates.
The forecasting abilities of agency, government and mortgage repo rates are very
similar. Government repo rates have slightly better forecasting abilities for both daily and
expected average 90 day federal funds rates than do agency and mortgage repo rates
during the sample years 1991 through 2006.
2.7 Conclusions
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Firstly, expectation theory is found to work extremely well by using 3-month repo
rates instead of Treasury bill rates, since the repurchase agreements are very efficient
money market instruments. The repurchase agreements are the first widely used money
market instruments, while the Treasury bill rates ranked the fifth. This result is consistent
with Longstaff's (2000) finding. Longstaff (2000) found evidence to support pure
expectation hypothesis by using shorter term repo rate. In other words, long term repo
rates can forecast the average future overnight repo rates very well. By ignoring the recent
abnormal data resulting from the financial crisis, the expectation theory works better by
applying 1-month or 3-month repo rates. Furthermore, the expectation theory works
extremely well by using 3-month repo rates, which again tells us the importance of good
quality data. However, not all the data is within control, for example: federal funds rates
came very close to 0. The abnormal federal funds rate data confuses the market
expectations for the economy, and it is out of control. Under that specific circumstance,
the Federal Reserve had to lower the federal funds rate as much as it can.
Secondly, this paper tried to explore why the expectation theory works not as well
when using 1-month repo rates instead of 3-month repo rates. One may think that it is
because the average 90 day federal funds rates are easier to be captured by the market,
because it is less volatile than the average 30 day federal funds rates. However, the
statistics show that the average 90 day federal funds rates are more volatile than the
average 30 day federal funds rates. Please see table 2.41 and 2.42. Further research may
be needed to pin point the underlying resons for the different results.
Thirdly, the expectation theory performs a lot better by applying repo rates instead of
Treasury bill rates as risk free rates. This may suggest that repo rates might be better risk
free rates than Treasury bill rates. However, this paper did not find evidence to support
the pure form of expectation theory, because the coefficient on term premium is
significantly different from zero.
Last but not least, 3-month repo rates could forecast the average 90 day federal funds
rates very well. To to be more specific, agency, government and mortgage repo rates have
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a much better ability for forecasting both daily and expected average 90 day federal funds
rates than Treasury bill rates. The forecasting abilities of agency, government and
mortgage repo rates are very similar. Government repo rates have slightly better
forecasting abilities for both daily and expected average 90 day federal funds rates than
do agency and mortgage repo rates during both the sample periods from 2001 to 2006 and
from 1991 to 2006.
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Table 2.5 The expectation performance of 3-month Treasury bill rates (Equation 12)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .855132** .0161927 52.81 0.000 .8233872 .8868769
b2 -.0000239 .0116297 -0.00 0.998 -.0228233 .0227755
Constant
(b0)
.0963647** .0053433 18.03 0.000 .0858896 .1068399
Table 2.6 The expectation performance of 3-month mortgage repo rates (Equation 13)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .3878825** .0151705 25.57 0.000 .3581416 .4176235
b2 .0797492** .0158428 5.03 0.000 .0486904 .1108081
Constant
(b0)
-.0399339** .0046549 -8.58 0.000 -.0490597 -.0308082
Table 2.7 The expectation performance of 3-month agency repo rates (Equation 14)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .4872037** .0081857 59.52 0.000 .4711561 .5032512
b2 .1993339** .0081372 24.50 0.000 .1833813 .2152865
Constant
(b0)
-.0420987** .0035916 -11.72 0.000 -.0491397 -.0350577
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Table 2.8 The expectation performance of 3-month government repo rates (Equation 15)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .3844628** .0154654 24.86 0.000 .3541437 .4147819
b2 .0795327** .0160495 4.96 0.000 .0480687 .1109968
Constant
(b0)
-.0302655** .0046643 -6.49 0.000 -.0394097 -.0211213
Table 2.9 The expectation performance of 3-month mortgage repo rates (Equation 16)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .3735851** .0158267 23.60 0.000 .3425578 .4046124
b2 .0775843** .0163398 4.75 0.000 .0455512 .1096175
Constant
(b0)
-.0157315
**
.0047496 -3.31 0.001 -.0250428 -.0064201
Table 2.10 The expectation performance of 3-month agency repo rates (Equation 17)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .3841263** .0160283 23.97 0.000 .3527037 .4155488
b2 .0784544** .0161034 4.87 0.000 .0468845 .1100242
Constant
(b0)
-.0339335** .0053848 -6.30 0.000 -.0444901 -.023377
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Table 2.11 The expectation performance of 3-month government repo rates (Equation 18)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .2939622** .0059066 49.77 0.000 .2823825 .3055418
b2 -.033072** .0117251 -2.82 0.005 -.0560583 -.0100857
Constant
(b0)
.0176868** .0054562 3.24 0.001 .0069902 .0283834
Table 2.12 The expectation performance of 3-month mortgage repo rates (Equation 19)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .3065694** .005354 57.26 0.000 .2960731 .3170656
b2 -.0291434** .0113536 -2.57 0.010 -.0514014 -.0068854
Constant
(b0)
-.0074219 .0054261 -1.37 0.171 -.0180595 .0032157
Table 2.13 The expectation performance of 3-month agency repo rates (Equation 20)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .3033689 ** .00569 53.32 0.000 .292214 .3145238
b2 -.0291796 .0116202 -2.51 0.012 -.0519604 -.0063988
Constant
(b0)
.0021564** .0054762 0.39 0.694 -.0085794 .0128921
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Table 2.14 The expectation performance of 1-month Treasury bill rates [Equation (12)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .2257429** .0138744 16.27 0.000 .198535 .2529508
b2 .121209** .0117501 10.32 0.000 .098167 .144251
Constant
(b0)
-.0037245 .0037978 -0.98 0.327 -.0111721 .003723
Table 2.15 The expectation performance of 1-month mortgage repo rates [Equation (13)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .1953029** .0126252 15.47 0.000 .1705447 .220061
b2 .1217386** .0127657 9.54 0.000 .096705 .1467721
Constant
(b0)
-.0288104** .0036811 -7.83 0.000 -.0360292 -.0215917
Table 2.16 The expectation performance of 1-month agency repo rates [Equation (14)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .1906754** .0126955 15.02 0.000 .1657793 .2155715
b2 .1220119** .0130206 9.37 0.000 .0964783 .1475455
Constant
(b0)
-.0278997** .0037066 -7.53 0.000 -.0351684 -.0206311
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Table 2.17 The expectation performance of 1-month government repo rates [Equation
(15)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .1953356** .0128761 15.17 0.000 .1700855 .2205858
b2 .121782** .013151 9.26 0.000 .0959927 .1475713
Constant
(b0)
-.0218126** .0036892 -5.91 0.000 -.0290471 -.0145781
Table 2.18 The expectation performance of 1-month mortgage repo rates [Equation (16)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .1873153** .011473 16.33 0.000 .1648166 .209814
b2 .1191608** .0120271 9.91 0.000 .0955755 .142746
Constant
(b0)
-.0406685** .004591 -8.86 0.000 -.0496715 -.0316656
Table 2.19 The expectation performance of 1-month agency repo rates [Equation (17)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .171021** .0105356 16.23 0.000 .1503605 .1916814
b2 .1113974** .0114487 9.73 0.000 .0889465 .1338483
Constant
(b0)
-.035732** .0043784 -8.16 0.000 -.0443181 -.0271458
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Table 2.20 The expectation performance of 1-month government repo rates [Equation
(18)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .1163421** .0054024 21.54 0.000 .105748 .1269362
b2 .0590414** .0056858 10.38 0.000 .0478914 .0701914
Constant
(b0)
-.0219031** .0036865 -5.94 0.000 -.0291324 -.0146738
Table 2.21 The expectation performance of 1-month mortgage repo rates [Equation (19)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .1148022** .0051406 22.33 0.000 .1047215 .1248829
b2 .0612715** .0055851 10.97 0.000 .050319 .072224
Constant
(b0)
-.034387** .0040555 -8.48 0.000 -.04234 -.0264341
Table 2.22 The expectation performanc of 1-month agency repo rates [Equation (20)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .1077169** .0048148 22.37 0.000 .0982749 .1171588
b2 .0598584** .0054223 11.04 0.000 .0492253 .0704915
Constant
(b0)
-.0320661** .0040081 -8.00 0.000 -.0399261 -.0242062
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Table 2.23 The expectation performance of 1-month Treasury bill rates [Equation (12)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .5078731** .0239359 21.22 0.000 .4609183 .5548278
b2 .3662564** .0161158 22.73 0.000 .3346424 .3978704
Constant
(b0)
-.0435749** .0047618 -9.15 0.000 -.0529161 -.0342337
Table 2.24 The expectation performance of 1-month mortgage repo rates [Equation (13)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .4148832** .0315661 13.14 0.000 .3529605 .4768059
b2 .3860716** .0437623 8.82 0.000 .3002239 .4719193
Constant
(b0)
-.0663248** .0048679 -13.62 0.000 -.075874 -.0567755
Table 2.25 The expectation performance of 1-month agency repo rates [Equation (14)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .4171425** .0309221 13.49 0.000 .3564831 .4778019
b2 .3907178** .0421999 9.26 0.000 .3079348 .4735007
Constant
(b0)
-.0666181** .0048661 -13.69 0.000 -.0761638 -.0570723
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Table 2.26 The expectation performance of 1-month government repo rates [Equation
(15)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .4047939** .0317687 12.74 0.000 .3424738 .4671139
b2 .3616862** .0465842 7.76 0.000 .2703027 .4530697
Constant
(b0)
-.0619716** .0051314 -12.08 0.000 -.0720377 -.0519054
Table 2.27 The expectation performance of 1-month mortgage repo rates [Equation (16)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .2948247** .0303059 9.73 0.000 .2353742 .3542752
b2 .2614054** .0505192 5.17 0.000 .1623028 .360508
Constant
(b0)
-.0768651** .007789 -9.87 0.000 -.0921446 -.0615856
Table 2.28 The expectation performance of 1-month agency repo rates [Equation (17)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .2735823** .0305355 8.96 0.000 .2136814 .3334833
b2 .2403429** .0524035 4.59 0.000 .1375438 .343142
Constant
(b0)
-.073822** .0080607 -9.16 0.000 -.0896346 -.0580095
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Table 2.29 The expectation performance of 1-month government repo rates [Equation
(18)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 1478132** .0081505 18.14 0.000 .1318244 .1638019
b2 .0448425** .0201798 2.22 0.026 .0052562 .0844288
Constant
(b0)
-.0327561** .0047726 -6.86 0.000 -.0421184 -.0233938
Table 2.30 The expectation performance of 1-month mortgage repo rates [Equation (19)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .1266883** .0072008 17.59 0.000 .1125625 .1408141
b2 .0563003** .0205597 2.74 0.006 .0159686 .096632
Constant
(b0)
-.0455574** .0051205 -8.90 0.000 -.0556021 -.0355126
Table 2.31 The expectation performance of 1-month agency repo rates [Equation (20)']
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .1215584** .006958 17.47 0.000 .107909 .1352078
b2 .0656178** .0203237 3.23 0.001 .0257491 .1054864
Constant
(b0)
-.0474277** .0051912 -9.14 0.000 -.0576111 -.0372442
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Table 2.32 The expectation performance of 3-month Treasury bill rates (Equation 12)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 1.505271** .0806001 18.68 0.000 1.347159 1.663383
b2 1.365926** .0630549 21.66 0.000 1.242233 1.48962
Constant
(b0)
-.1096741** .0118327 -9.27 0.000 -.1328861 -.0864622
Table 2.33 The expectation performance of 3-month mortgage repo rates (Equation 13)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .9785054** .0320247 30.55 0.000 .915683 1.041328
b2 .7754894** .0371179 20.89 0.000 .7026759 .848303
Constant
(b0)
-.1264201** .0065446 -19.32 0.000 -.1392585 -.1135817
Table 2.34 The expectation performance of 3-month agency repo rates (Equation 14)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .9844044** .0325848 30.21 0.000 .9204834 1.048325
b2 .7834065** .0376714 20.80 0.000 .7095072 .8573057
Constant
(b0)
-.1271211** .0065964 -19.27 0.000 -.1400612 -.114181
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Table 2.35 The expectation performance of 3-month government repo rates (Equation 15)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .9734084** .030659 31.75 0.000 .9132651 1.033552
b2 .7525485** .0362521 20.76 0.000 .6814333 .8236636
Constant
(b0)
-.1101518** .0059585 -18.49 0.000 -.1218404 -.0984631
Table 2.36 The expectation performance of 3-month mortgage repo rates (Equation 16)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .7625493** .0246468 30.94 0.000 .7142 .8108987
b2 .559231** .0332487 16.82 0.000 .4940075 .6244544
Constant
(b0)
-.1505104** .0070069 -21.48 0.000 -.1642557 -.1367651
Table 2.37 The expectation performance of 3-month government repo rates (Equation 17)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .7713213** .0258084 29.89 0.000 .7206935 .8219491
b2 .5726701** .0353386 16.21 0.000 .5033469 .6419933
Constant
(b0)
-.1535444** .0069762 -22.01 0.000 -.1672296 -.1398592
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Table 2.38 The expectation performance of 3-month government repo rates (Equation 18)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .3241937** .0086042 37.68 0.000 .307315 .3410724
b2 .2746431** .0419441 6.55 0.000 .192362 .3569242
Constant
(b0)
-.094966 .009365 -10.14 0.000 -.1133371 -.0765948
Table 2.39 The expectation performance of 3-month mortgage repo rates (Equation 19)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .3032037** .0082676 36.67 0.000 .2869853 .3194222
b2 .2799851** .0431056 6.50 0.000 .1954256 .3645446
Constant
(b0)
-.1175716** .0099501 -11.82 0.000 -.1370905 -.0980526
Table 2.40 The expectation performance of 3-month agency repo rates (Equation 20)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .3009399** .0082479 36.49 0.000 .2847602 .3171197
b2 .3008489** .0433827 6.93 0.000 .2157458 .385952
Constant
(b0)
-.1212271** .0100655 -12.04 0.000 -.1409725 -.1014817
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Table 2.41 Summary statistics on the average 90-days federal funds rate
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sumrff90 1384 4.805195 1.513999 1.557444 7.594444
Table 2.42 Summary statistics on the average 30-days federal funds rate
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sumrff30 1384 4.752793 1.506104 1.332333 7.356667
Table 2.43 Summary statistics on the 1-month agency repo rate
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
rra1m 1384 2.576582 1.509047 .9 5.33
Table 2.44 Summary statistics on the 3-month agency repo rate
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
rra3m 1384 2.623743 1.530158 .87 5.41
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Table 2.45 Test for heteroskedasticity (Equation 12)
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
−∑ tRFF
chi2(1) = 315.07
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Table 2.46 Test for heteroskedasticity (Equation 13)
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
−∑ tRFF
chi2(1) = 1616.63
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Table 2.47 Test for heteroskedasticity (Equation 14)
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
−∑ tRFF
chi2(1) = 1727.24
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Table 2.48 Test for heteroskedasticity (Equation 15)
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of
90
1
( ) / 90t i
i
RFF +
=
−∑ tRFF
chi2(1) = 2071.14
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Table 2.51 The expectation performance of 3-month agency repo rates (Equation 14)
(1991-2006)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 0.8868378 0.0100245 88.47 0.000 .8671841 .9064916
b2 0.6669706 0.0118424 56.32 0.000 .6437527 .6901884
Constant
(b0)
-0.01117347 0.002923 -38.23 0.000 -.1174655 -.1060039
Table 2.52 The expectation performance of 3-month government repo rates (Equation 15)
(1991-2006)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .8780698 .0098856 88.82 0.000 .8586883 .8974513
b2 .6361386 .0118835 53.53 0.000 .6128401 .659437
Constant
(b0)
-.1022902 .0028706 -35.63 0.000 -.1079182 -.0966623
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Table 2.53 The expectation performance of 3-month mortgage repo rates (Equation
13) (1991-2006)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 .8801673 .0100423 87.65 0.000 .9804785 .899856
b2 .6556642 .0119347 54.94 0.000 .6322654 .6790631
Constant
(b0)
-.1182219 .0029264 -40.40 0.000 -.1239594 -.1124844
Table 2.54 The expectation performance of 3-month Treasury bill rates (Equation 12)
(1991-2006)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
b1 1.12451 .016392 68.60 0.000 1.092372 1.156647
b2 .7861445 .0232319 33.84 0.000 .7405967 .8316923
Constant
(b0)
-.0701322 .0067715 -10.36 0.000 -.0834083 -.0568561
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3 Chapter 3: Discount rate changes and their effects on market returns
during recent U.S. recessions
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the market response to the discount rate changes during the
recent U.S. recessions and finds that the response of market rates to discount rate
changes varied during the recent two recessions. The different responses of market
rates to discount rate changes are due to the various economic and policy
circumstances that the market was facing. This conclusion is consistent with
Thornton's finding (1998). Thornton (1998) found that the different market responses
to the discount rate changes mainly depend on the information content that people
believed contained in the announcements of the discount rate changes. It's interesting
to point out that during the "Great Recession", market rates were not sensitive to
discount rate changes. The underlying reason was the discount rates were above the
federal funds rates during the "Great Recession". In other words, the discount
window borrowing has lost its function to provide adequate funds to the economy
during the recession.
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3.1 Background
3.1.1 Discount rate as an important monetary policy instrument
The public is already getting used to consider the federal funds rate as a major
monetary policy instrument. Many people were shocked when the Federal Reserve
announced to raise the discount rate by 0.25 percent on February, 19, 2010, What is the
implication of the Federal Reserve's action? Is it simply a technical change to keep
discount rate certain level with the federal funds rate or is it a tightening monetary policy?
This study was motivated by these questions and tried to further explore the related area
of the discount rate.
The discount rate became monetary instrument in the United States as early as 1907.
When the Federal Reserve was first established to fight the Panic of 1907, discount
window and discount rate were the only monetary policy instruments.
3.1.2 A new method of establishing the discount rate from 2003
Before 2003, the discount rate was set below the target federal funds rate. From
January 2003 up to the crisis in 2007, the discount rate was one percentage point above
the target federal funds rate. A bank could borrow at the discount window if it was
financially sound and willing to pay a relatively high interest rate.
3.1.3 More frequent changes in discount rates during recessions
As an important monetary policy instrument, discount rate was used much more
frequently in recessions. The history of discount rate data shows that usually the discount
rate is lowered as soon as the recession starts. As the recession gets deeper and deeper, the
discount rate is lowered again and again. Once the recession is close to an end, the
discount rate is raised accordingly.
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3.1.4 A unique problem in the discount window borrowing and the creation of TAF
If the discount rate is higher than the federal funds rate, then borrowing from the
Federal Reserve is more expensive than borrowing at the federal funds market, which is
fine during normal times. However, during the recent financial crisis, although the
discount rate was cut 12 times, it was never below the federal funds rate, which means the
discount window could no longer ease the liquidity problem during the time of crisis. This
is a unique problem that occurred in the recent crisis, because never in the U.S. history
was the discount rate higher than the federal funds rate during any recessions.
Usually before 2003, the discount rate was much lower than the federal funds rate
during recessions, compared to normal times.
It is quite obvious that the Fed was facing a unique problem in the discount window
borrowing during the "Great Recession". Partly in response to this problem, the Federal
Reserve created TAF borrowing and other borrowing facilities to allow banks borrow
money from other channels rather than the discount window. As it was well known, banks
were not willing to borrow from the discount window anyway, because it may signal the
bank's poor condition and the possibility of insolvency. Just as Cecchetti (2008) said in
his paper, "Realizing that their traditional instruments were inadequate for responding to
the crisis that began on August 2007, Federal Reserve Officials improvised." The Fed
started to implement a variety of changes to make sure that the banking institutions which
needed the most funds can get the liquidity. For instance, the Federal Reserve initiated
TAF borrowing.
3.1.5 The relationship between a recession and a financial crisis
In the United States, it is the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) that
defines the beginning and ending dates of the U.S. recessions. The NBER defines a
recession if there is a significant decline in GDP, real income, employment, industrial
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production, and wholesale-retail sales.7 The recent sub-prime mortgage crisis is usually
called a "financial crisis", which is also a recession. One might ask what the difference
between financial crisis and recession is. A financial crisis must be a recession, but a
recession is not necessarily a financial crisis. We consider a recession a "financial crisis",
if some financial institutions or assets suddenly lose a large part of their value. The recent
sub-prime mortgage crisis is considered as a "financial crisis", since it associated with
stock market crash, bankruptcies of large investment banks, and banking panics. Many
recessions are financial crises, since usually those phenomena occur at the same time.
3.1.6 Another breaking point: 1960s
Before the early 1960s, the Federal Reserve normally did not explain why they
changed the discount rate. They just simply changed it with no any further interpretation
of policy indication. After the early 1960s, the Federal Reserve announced the reasons for
the change of the discount rate so that the public is able to better understand the
movements of the Fed and make a better decision. This is an indication that the Federal
Reserve indeed improved its transparency.
3.1.7 Classification of discount rate changes
Discount rate changes can be considered either technical or nontechnical according
to Thornton (1982): if the discount rate is simply adjusted to keep certain level of
difference with market rates such as the federal funds rate, then it is a technical change.
Otherwise, it is a non-technical change. Later, some other researchers such as Cook and
Hahn (1988) did a more complicated classification. They classified discount rate changes
into three types. "Type 1" is technical changes; "Type 3" is non-technical changes,
meaning that the Federal Reserve changed the discount rate to deal with the inflation,
7 See Wikipedia for more details about the definition of "recession".
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economic growth, growth rate of money, and some other macroeconomic variables;
"Type2" is the mixture of "Type 1" and " Type 3".
This paper follows Thornton's (1982) straightforward way of classification: discount
rate changes are divided into technical, TDR∆ , or non-technical, NTDR∆ , depending on
whether the discount rate changes were made purely to keep the discount rate a certain
level of difference with market rates or otherwise.
3.2 Motivation
Discount rate changes were much more frequent in the recession times compared to
normal times. Thus it is worth exploring the discount rate changes and their effects on
market rates during the recessions. From 1996 to 20118, the discount rate has been
resettled 52 times, among which, only two times were technical changes, and the rest
were non-technical changes. Generally speaking, when the economy was in a good shape,
the Fed will increase the discount rate to fight inflation. However, If the economy was
facing a downturn, the Fed will reduce the discount rate to accommodate the unfavorable
situation. During the years 1996 through 2011, there have been two U.S. recessions, early
2000s recession and the "Great Recession" respectively. The early 2000s recession
covered the period from March, 2001 to November, 2001, totalling eight months. At that
time, Green Span was in charge of the Federal Reserve, the discount rate was reduced 7
times in those short 8 months, and this frequency is very high. The "Great recession", also
known as sub-prime mortgage crisis, started in December, 2007 and ended in June 2009,
totalling one year and six months, which occurred when the Federal Reserve was under
the charge of Bernanke. The discount rate was cut 12 times during this period. In
conclusion, among 52 changes during the years 1996 through 2011, 19 occurred during
8 The "Press Release" of the Federal Reserve can be found back to 1996, which explained why the the Fed
changed discount rate. According to the announcement, this paper further classified the discount rate
changes into technical changes or non-technical changes.
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the recession time. There were 16 years or 192 months in total, during which 26 months
were in recession. That is, 13.5 percent of the time was in recession and 36.5 percent of
the discount rate changes occurred during the recessions. Therefore, the discount rate
changes were more frequent during the recessions compared to normal times. Many
existing literatures have studied the discount rate, but no literature has tried to explore the
discount rate changes during different U.S. recessions. In fact, it is important to
understand the market's response patterns to discount rate changes in recessions, because
it will help the Fed to make a more efficient monetary policy during that period of time.
This paper will explore the discount rate changes and their impacts on market rates for
recent U.S. recessions.
3. 3 Literature Review
Many researchers found that the market rates often respond to the non-technical
discount rate changes rather than technical discount rate changes. Batten and Thornton
(1983) found that announcements of non-technical discount rate changes have significant
impact on the dollar's exchange rate. Thornton (1994) investigated why the market rates
responded to non-technical discount rate changes. His finding contradicts Cook and
Hahn's (1988) hypothesis that Treasury bill rates respond to discount rate changes simply
because it signals the changes in the federal funds rate. Cook and Hahn (1988) found
evidence that announcements of the discount rate changes signal the changes in the
federal funds rate and hence had a significant effect on Treasury bill rates. Thornton
(1998) found that the discount rate changes do not signal the changes in monetary policy.
The announcement effect is different mainly depending on the information that people
believed contained in those announcements. He also pointed out that the direct effect on
the markets rates is near to zero. Smirlock and Yawiz (1985) found that markets do not
respond to the technical discount rate changes and only react to the discount rate changes
when people believed that there is a shift in the monetary policy. This finding is
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consistent with Thornton's findings (1998). The "markets" that Smirlock and Yawiz
checked are stock returns and bond rates with different maturities. Goodfriend's (1991)
evidence showed the Federal Reserve control the short-term interest rates by using the
discount rate often. Chen, Mohan and Steiner (1999) found that stock market returns
respond to the non-technical announcements in discount rate changes significantly.
Thornton (1996) explores the discount rate policies of five Federal Reserve
chairmen: Martin, Burns, Miller, Volcker and Greenspan. He checked the market
responses to discount rate changes under those five chairmen respectively and found
Burns and Volcker's discount rate policies were the most effective and Miller's the least
effective. The reason for this different response is that Burns and Volcker provided the
market with more complete information when they changed the discount rate than other
chairmen. This conclusion is consistent with another Thornton's paper (1998), which
suggested that market response varied to the change of the discount rate over time, mainly
depending on the information content contained in the announcements of the discount rate
changes.
This paper will study the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the early 2000s U.S.
recession. Because the discount rate policy is not the same under different Federal
Reserve chairmen suggested by Thornton (1996), this paper divided recessions based on
the terms of different chairmen. When Greenspan became chairman, he dealt with the
early 2000s recession. The "Great Recession" occurred as Bernanke took charge of the
Federal Reserve one year later.
3.4 The Data and Model
The data on interest rates are daily (business day only) from 1996 to 2010. The
change in the discount rate is the percentage change in the discount rate on the day that a
discount rate change was announced. The market interest rates are 3-month Treasury bill
110
rates, 3-month mortgage repo rates, 3-month agency repo rates and 3-month government
repo rates.
This paper follows Thornton's (1982) straightforward way of classification: discount
rate changes are divided into technical, TDR∆ , or non-technical, NTDR∆ , depending on
whether the discount rate changes were made purely to keep the discount rate a certain
level of difference with market rates or otherwise.
To test the hypothesis of whether the market responses to the discount rate changes
were significantly different during the period of different recessions, this paper will apply
Thorton's model (1998):
1( ) ( )t t t NT NT T T ti L i L FR DR DR−(1)    ∆ = α + β ∆ + δ ∆ + µ ∆ + µ ∆ + ε
i∆ is the percentage change in 3-month Treasury bill rates or 3-month repo rates.
Equation (1) represents that the change in market rates may depend on the change in
previous market rates, the change in both current and lagged federal funds rates, the
technical change in the discount rate and the nontechnical change in the discount rate. All
of the changes here are percentage changes.
( )Lβ and ( )Lδ are in the lag forms.
We can compare the sign and the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for
different U.S. recessions in general, and then further check these coefficients under
different chairmen.
3.5 The Responses Results of 3-month Treasury bill rates
3.5.1 Result 1 (1996-2010)
Firstly, this paper ran the regression on the following equation over the period from
1996 to 2010. Since among 52 changes in the discount rate, only two of which are
technical changes, occurred in 2003 and 2010 respectively, I combined all the discount
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rate changes together as non-technical changes for simplicity. Equation (1) becomes
equation (2):
1( ) ( )t t t NT ti L i L FR DR−(2)    ∆ = α + β ∆ + δ ∆ + µ ∆ + ε
The dependent variable is the percentage change in the 3-month Treasury bill rate.
The independent variables are the percentage change in the lagged 3-month Treasury bill
rate, both current and lagged federal funds rates, and the discount rate. This paper found
that there are 5 lags in the 3-month Treasury bill rate, which indicates that the change of
the 3 month Treasury bill rate correlates to the the change of the 3-month Treasury bill
rate, up to 5 business days before. Moreover, this paper found coefficients on both
discount rate changes and changes in the federal funds rate are not significantly different
from zero.
3.5.2 Result 2 (Early 2000s recession: March, 2001 to November, 2001)
Because from the first result, this paper found evidence that the coefficient on the
change in the federal funds rate is not significantly different from zero, so the term of the
percentage change in federal funds rate can be ignored. Furthermore, there is no technical
change in the discount rate during this period of time. Equation (1) now becomes equation
(3):
1( )t t NT NT ti L i DR−(3)    ∆ = α + β ∆ + µ ∆ + ε
This paper found that the 3-month Treasury bill rate moves the same direction with
the discount rate.
The coefficient on the discount rate is significantly different from zero.
3.5.3 Result 3 (Great Recession: December, 2007 - June, 2009)
Coefficients on both discount rate and federal funds rate change are not significantly
different from zero. It might have something to do with the TAF borrowing, or the new
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method of establishing the discount rate. Since 2003, there is a new method of
establishing the discount rate, which set the discount rate 100 basis above the federal
funds rate, which made the discount rate higher than the federal funds rate. In other words,
the discount window borrowing lost its functions during the recent financial crisis. Hence,
the Federal Reserve created TAF borrowing and other borrowing facilities to
accommodate the recent financial crisis. This helps explain the fact that market rates were
not sensitive to the discount rate changes during the "Great Recession".
That the coefficient on the discount rate is not significantly different from zero
indicates that the change in the discount rate has no significant impact on the change in
the 3-month Treasury bill rate.
Since there are no technical changes in this recession either, the equation (1)
becomes equation (4) :
1( ) ( )t t t NT NT ti L i L FR DR−(4)    ∆ = α + β ∆ + δ ∆ + µ ∆ + ε
This paper also tried to run regression on equation (5):
1( )t t NT NT ti L i DR−(5)    ∆ = α + β ∆ + µ ∆ + ε
Removing the term of the federal funds rate in equation (5), the coefficient on the
change in the discount rate is not significantly different from zero either.
3.6 The Response Results of 3-month repo rates
From Chapter 2, we know that the 3-month repo rate is one of the important market
rates for forecasting monetary policy. Therefore, this paper tests the 3-month repo rates
response pattern to discount rate changes. Besides 3-month Treasury bill rates, this
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chapter will test how three types of 3-month repo rates responded to discount rate changes
during the two recent U.S. recessions.
3.6.1 The responses of 3-month government repo rates
Using different estimation equations (See tables 3.11 through 3.14), this paper shows
that during the early 2000s recession, 3-month government repo rates did not respond to
either federal funds rates or discount rate changes significantly at both 1% and 5%
significance levels.
During the "Great Recession," 3-month government repo rates did not respond to
either discount rate changes or changes in federal funds rates significantly at both 1% and
5% significance levels (See tables 3.15 through 3.18). However, the significance levels of
the coefficients of both federal funds rates and discount rate changes were higher during
the early 2000s recession than during the "Great Recession." This may suggest that the 3-
month government repo rates are less responsive to both discount rate changes and federal
funds rates during the "Great Recession" than during the early 2000s recession.
3.6.2 The responses of 3-month agency repo rates
During both early 2000 recession and the "Great Recession," 3-month agency repo
rates did not respond to either discount rate changes or federal funds rates at both 1% and
5% significance levels.
3.6.3 The responses of 3-month mortgage repo rates
During early 2000 recession, 3-month mortgage repo rates responded only to
discount rate changes at a 5% significance level. At 1% significance level, 3-month
mortgage repo rates did not respond to either discount rate changes or federal funds rates.
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During the "Great Recession," 3-month mortgage repo rates did not respond to either
discount rate changes or federal funds rates significantly at both 1% and 5% significance
levels.
3.6.4 The summarization of the responses results of 3-month repo rates
At a 1% significance level, 3-month government, agency and government repo rates
did not respond to either discount rate changes or federal funds rates significantly during
both early 2000s recession and the "Great Recession." This provided evidence that the
response patterns of 3-month repo rates to discount rate changes were quite similar. From
the second chapter, we know that the forecasting ability of three types of 3-month repo
rates for monetary policy are also similar. This provided evidence for future researchers
that the three types of 3-month repo rates have similar characteristics.
At a 5% significance level, both 3-month government and agency repo rates did not
respond to either discount rate changes or federal funds rates significantly during both
early 2000s recession and the "Great Recession." However, 3-month mortgage repo rates
responded to discount rate changes during early 2000s recession and did not respond to
discount rate changes during the "Great Recession." To be more specific, 3-month
mortgage repo rates moved the same direction with discount rate changes during the early
2000s recession and were not responsive to discount rate changes during the "Great
Recession." This is consistent with the response patterns of 3-month Treasury bill rates.
This result further provids evidence that the market rates tended to be less responsive to
discount rate changes during the "Great Recession." It is due to the fact that the discount
window borrowing has lost its function during the "Great Recession."
3.7 Conclusions
3.7.1 The responses of market rates to the discount rate changes during U.S. recessions
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Firstly, this paper shows that the responses of 3-month Treasury bill rates to the
discount rate changes varied during the recent two recessions. During the early 2000s
recession, the 3-month Treasury bill rate responded significantly to the discount rate
changes. More specifically, the 3-month Treasury bill rate moved the same direction as
the discount rate. However, the reaction of the 3-month Treasury bill rate to the discount
rate changes was not significant during the "Great Recession." Why are the responses of
the 3-month Treasury bill rate to the discount rate changes different between the two
recessions? One of the reasons could be that the discount window borrowing has lost its
function during the "Great Recession," since the discount rates were above the federal
funds rates during the recent recession. Banking sectors borrowed funds from other
channels instead, for instance, TAF facilities. In this case, market rates were no longer
sensitive to the discount rate changes. To sum up, the different responses of market rates
to the discount rate changes are due to the various economic and policy circumstances
that the market was facing. This conclusion is consistent with Thornton’s finding (1998).
He found evidence that the announcement effect of the discount rate changes varied
because of the information that people believed contained in the announcement.
Secondly, this paper showed that at a 1% significance level, 3-month government,
agency and government repo rates did not respond to either discount rate changes or
federal funds rates significantly during both early 2000s recession and "Great Recession."
At a 5% significance level, both 3-month government and agency repo rates did not
respond to either discount rate changes or federal funds rates significantly during both
early 2000s recession and "Great Recession." However, 3-month mortgage repo rates
responded to discount rate changes during early 2000s recession and did not respond to
discount rate changes during "Great Recession." To be more specific, 3-month mortgage
repo rates moved the same direction with discount rate changes during early 2000s
recession and were not responsive to discount rate changes during the "Great Recession."
This is consistent with the response patterns of 3-month Treasury bill rates. This result
further provided evidence that the market rates tended to be less responsive to discount
116
rate changes during the "Great Recession." It is due to the fact that the discount window
borrowing has lost its function during the "Great Recession."
Last but not least, this paper supports Thornton's (1994) finding, which contradicts
Cook and Hahn's (1988) Hypothesis that the Treasury bill rates respond to discount rate
changes simply because it signals the changes in the federal funds rate. The estimation
results of this paper show that both the 3-month Treasury bill rate and 3-month repo rates
did not significantly respond to the changes in federal funds rates at both 1% and 5%
significance levels during both recent recessions.
3.7.2 Some findings on the Characteristics of three types of 3-month repo rates
First of all, three types of 3-month repo rates have similar trends over the recent two
decades. In other words, they move together at the same time.
Notes: The above figure used a stacked line chart to show the trend of the three types of
repo rates. It is very obvious that they tend to move together. The 3-month mortgage repo
rate has the highest value of all the three types of repo rates, because a mortgage
repurchase agreement is more risky than the other two repurchase agreements. Both
government and agency repurchase agreements enjoy protections from U.S. Government.
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Secondly, when using three types of 3-month repo rates as long term rates
respectively, expectation theory is found to perform extremely well in all the three cases.
Thirdly, three types of 3-month repo rates have very similar forecasting ability for
federal funds rates.
Last but not least, three types of 3-month repo rates were not responsive to discount
rate changes during the recent U.S. recessions at a 1% significance level.
To sum up, three types of 3-month repo rates have similar characteristics. They have
similar moving trends over time, similar performances in expectation theory, similar
forecasting abilities for future federal funds rates, and similar response patterns to
discount rate changes.
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Table 3.1: Recent U.S. recessions and corresponding chairmen
Chairman Term U.S. Recession
Alan Greenspan August 11, 1987 - Jannuary 31,
2006
Early 1990s recession
Early 2000s recession
Ben Bernanke February 1, 2006 - present Great Recession
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Table 3.2: Classification of discount rate changes (1996-2011)
(Information was collected from the website of Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, and was edited and consolidated by myself. According to the reasons for
the changes of the discount rates that the Federal Reserve released, I classified the
discount rate changes into either technical changes or non-technical changes.) From 1996
to 2011, the discount rate has been resettled 52 times, among which, only two times were
technical changes. The rest were non-technical changes. Generally speaking, when the
economy was in a good shape, the Federal Reserve would increase the discount rate to
fight inflation. However, if the economy was facing a downturn, the Federal Reserve
would reduce the discount rate to accommodate the poor situation. During the years 1996
through 2011, there has been two U.S. recessions, early 2000s recession and the "Great
Recession" respectively. The early 2000s recession covered the period from March, 2001
to November, 2001, totalling eight months. At that time, when Greenspan was in charge
of the Federal Reserve, the discount rate was reduced 7 times in those short 8 months, and
the frequency was very high. The "Great Recession", also known as sub-prime mortgage
crisis, started in December, 2007 and ended in June 2009, totalling one year and six
months, which happened when the Federal Reserve was under the charge of Bernanke.
The discount rate was cut 12 times during this period. Among 52 changes, 19 occurred
during the recession time. From 1996 to 2011, totalling 16 years or 192 months, 26
months were in recession. 13.5 percent of the time was in recession. 36.5 percent of the
discount rate changes occurred during the recessions. In conclusion, discount rate changes
were much more frequent in the recession times compared to normal times.
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Date of Press
Release
Decision Main Reasons Define the
change
April 13, 2010 Increase the discount rate
from 0.5 percent to 0.75
percent discussed on
February 17, 2010.
This is the first step for
the Fed to widen the
spread between the
discount rate and the
federal funds rate.
Technical
change
January 13,
2009
Decrease the discount rate
from 1.25 percent to 0.5
percent on December 16,
2008.
Financial crisis became
severe.
Non-
technical
change
November 25,
2008
Decrease the discount rate
from 1.75 percent to 1.25
percent on October 29, 2008.
Decrease the discount rate
from 2.25 percent to 1.75
percent approved on October
7, 2008.
Tight credit conditions in
financial market and
weakness in the labor
market were significant.
Non-
technical
change
May 27, 2008 Decrease the discount rate
from 2.5 percent to 2.25
percent approved on April
30, 2008.
Fed wanted to help the
economy out of the
financial crisis.
Non-
technical
change
April 15, 2008 Decrease the discount rate
from 3.25 percent to 2.5
percent approved on March
18, 2008.
Decrease the discount
rate from 3.5 percent to
3.25 percent approved on
March 16, 2008.
There is a further
deterioration in financial
conditions and the
economy.
Non-
technical
Change
(both)
February 26,
2008
Decrease the discount rate
from 4.75 percent to 4
percent approved on January
21, 2008.
The economic activity is
weak and downside risks
increase.
Non-
technical
Change
(both)
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Decrease the discount
rate from 4 percent to 3.5
percent approved on
January 30, 2008.
January 8, 2008 Decrease the discount rate
from 5 percent to 4.75
percent approved on
December 11, 2007.
The downside risks to
economic growth
increased and financial
market conditions
became worse.
Non-
technical
change
November 27,
2007
Decrease the discount rate
from 5.25 percent to 5
percent approved on October
31, 2007.
Housing sector had gone
worse.
Non-
technical
change
October 16,
2007
Decrease the discount rate
from 6.25 percent to 5.75
percent approved on
August 16, 2007.
Decrease the discount rate
from 5.75 percent to 5.25
percent approved on
September 18, 2007.
Credit became tight and
housing sector had been
intensified.
Non-
technical
Change
(both)
July 25, 2006 Increase the discount rate
from 6 percent to 6.25
percent approved on June 29,
2006.
Inflation pressures
occurred.
Non-
technical
change
June 6, 2006 Increase the discount
rate from 5.75 percent
to 6 percent approved
on May 10, 2006.
Economy was in
good shape except
for inflation
pressure.
Non-
technical
change
April 25, 2006 Increase the discount
rate from 5.5 percent
to 5.75 percent
approved on March
28, 2006.
Contained inflation. Non-
technical
change
122
February 28,
2006
Increase the discount
rate from 5.25 percent
to 5.5 percent
approved on January
31, 2006.
Inflation pressure. Non-
technical
change
January 10,
2006
Increase the discount
rate from 5 percent to
5.25 percent approved
on December 13,
2005.
Inflation risk and high
level of energy price.
Non-
technical
change
November 29,
2005
Increase the discount
rate from 4.75 percent
to 5 percent approved
on November 1, 2005.
High energy price was
added to inflation
pressure.
Non-
technical
change
October 18,
2005
Increase the discount
rate from 4.5 percent
to 4.75 percent
approved on
September 20, 2005.
Good economic
outlook called for
removal of the
monetary policy
accommodation.
Non-
technical
change
September 6,
2005
Increase the discount
rate from 4.25 percent
to 4.5 percent
approved on August 9,
2005.
Business conditions were
improving nationwide.
Non-
technical
change
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July 28, 2005 Increase the discount
rate from 4 percent to
4.25 percent approved
on June 30, 2005.
The economy was as
good as expected, with
modest inflation
pressure.
Non-
technical
change
May 31, 2005 Increase the discount rate
from 3.75 percent to 4
percent approved on May 3,
2005.
The gradual removal
of accommodative
monetary policy was
appropriate
Non-
technical
change
April 19, 2005 Increase the discount
rate from 3.5 percent
to 3.75 percent
approved on March
22, 2005.
Labor market and
investment improved
with signs of inflation.
Non-
technical
change
March 2, 2005 Increase the discount
rate from 3.25 percent
to 3.5 percent
approved on February
2, 2005.
Positive near-term
outlook for the
economy with
contained inflation.
Non-
technical
change
January 11,
2005
Increase in the discount rate
from 3 percent to 3.25
percent approved on
December 14, 2004.
Economic growth was
solid.
Non-
technical
change
December 21,
2004
Increase in the discount rate
from 2.75 percent to 3
percent approved on
November 10, 2004.
The economy
continued to expand
and it was time to
withdraw monetary
stimulus gradually.
Non-
technical
change
November 18,
2004
Increase the discount rate
from 2.5 percent to 2.75
percent approved on
September 21, 2004.
The economic outlook
was favorable.
Non-
technical
change
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September 30,
2004
Increase the discount rate
from 2.25 percent to 2.5
percent approved on August
10, 2004.
CPI showed an
increase in inflation.
Non-
technical
change
August 19,
2004
Increase the discount rate
from 2 percent to 2.25
percent approved on June 30,
2004.
The economy was
growing at a solid pace
and no longer needed
monetary
accommodation.
Non-
technical
change
August 21,
2003
Decrease the discount
rate from 2.25 percent to
2 percent approved on
June 25, 2003.
Expectations for
growth were
improving, but it was
too early to be
optimistic.
Non-
technical
change
March 28, 2003 Twelve Reserve Banks
approved new formula for
calculating discount rate on
January 6, 2003.
100 basis points above
the federal funds rate
Technical
change
December 23,
2002
Decrease the discount rate
from 1.25 percent to 0.75
percent approved on
November 6, 2002.
Consumer confidence
weakened related to
terrorism.
Non-
technical
change
February 8,
2002
Decrease the discount rate
from 1.5 percent to
1.25 percent approved on
December 11, 2001.
The economic outlook
remained uncertain.
Non-
technical
change
December 28,
2001
Decrease the discount rate
from 2 percent to
1.5 percent approved on
November 6, 2001.
Both business and
consumer confidence
weakened.
Non-
technical
change
November 16,
2001
Decrease the discount rate
from 2.5 percent
to 2 percent approved on
October 2, 2001.
September 11 event
effect.
Non-
technical
change
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October 26,
2001
Decrease the discount rate
from 3 percent to
2.5 percent approved on
September 17, 2001.
Employment, production,
and business spending
were weak. After
September 11, consumer
confidence dropped
further.
Non-
technical
change
October 26,
2001
Decrease the discount rate
from 3.25 percent to
3 percent approved on
August 21, 2001.
No significant signs of
economic recovery.
Non-
technical
change
October 26,
2001
Decrease the discount rate
from 3.5 percent to
3.25 percent approved on
June 27, 2001.
There had been an
continued decline in the
manufacturing.
Non-
technical
change
May 15, 2001 Decrease from 4 percent to
3.25 percent on May 15,
2001.
The economy was still
weak in the near future.
Non-
technical
change
April 19, 2001 Decrease the discount rate
from 4.5 percent to 4 percent
on April 19, 2001.
The economy was still
weak in the near future.
Non-
technical
change
March 20, 2001 Decrease the discount rate
from 5 percent to 4.5 percent
on March 20, 2001.
Investment spending was
weak.
Non-
technical
change
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January 31,
2001
Decrease the discount rate
from 5.5 percent to 5 percent
on January 31, 2001.
Consumer and business
confidence had been
weakened further due to
the high energy cost,
which lower the
purchasing power and
business profit.
Non-
technical
change
January 4, 2001 Decrease the discount rate
from 6 percent to 5.5 percent
on January 4, 2001.
Consumer and business
confidence had been
weakened further due to
the high energy cost,
which lower the
purchasing power and
business profit
Non-
technical
change
May 17, 2000 Increasing discount rate at
those banks from 5.5 percent
to 6 percent on May 18,
2000.
Inflation pressure. Non-
technical
change
March 21, 2000 Increase the discount rate
from 5.25 to 5.5 percent on
March 21, 2000.
Increased demand
exceeded potential
supply. Inflation pressure
occurred.
Non-
technical
change
February 2,
2000
Increase the discount rate
from 5 percent to 5.25
percent on February 2, 2000.
Increased demand
exceeded potential
supply. Inflation pressure
occurred.
Non-
technical
change
November 16,
1999
Increase in the discount rate
from 4.75 percent to 5
percent on November 16,
1999.
Inflation pressure. Non-
technical
change
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August 24,
1999
Increase the discount rate
from 4.5 percent to 4.75
percent on
August 24, 1999.
The overall economic
conditions were good, so
it was time to remove
monetary
accommodation.
Non-
technical
change
November 17,
1998
Decrease the discount rate
from 4.75 percent to 4.5
percent on November 17,
1998.
Although conditions in
financial markets have
gone well since October,
unusual strains remain.
Non-
technical
change
October 15,
1998
Decrease the discount rate
from 5 percent to 4.75
percent on October 15, 1998.
The conditions in
financial markets were
bad.
Non-
technical
change
January 31,
1996
Decrease the discount rate
from 5.25 percent to 5
percent on January 31, 1996.
Moderating economic
expansion in recent
months has reduced
potential inflationary
pressures.
Non-
technical
change
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Table 3.3: Three month Treasury bill rate with one lag (equation 2)
ctb3 Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
cfr -.0008239 .0004507 0.068 -.0017075 .0000598
ctb3l1 .8261811 .009318 0.000 .8079122 .84445
cdisr .0001602 .000849 0.850 -.0015044 .0018248
_cons -.087911 .0057384 0.000 -.0991616 -.0766603
Table 3.4: Three month Treasury bill rate with two lags (equation 2)
ctb3 Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
ctb3l1 .5119664* .0153012 0.000 .4819669 .5419658
ctb3l2 .3806851* .0153033 0.000 .3506815 .4106887
cfr -.0002791 .0004183 0.505 -.0010992 .000541
cdisr .0001119 .0007869 0.887 -.0014309 .0016546
_cons -.0539694* .0054905 0.000 -.064734 -.0432047
Table 3.5: Three month Treasury bill rate with four lags (equation 2)
ctb3 Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
ctb3l1 .310697* .0154823 0.000 .2803425 .3410515
ctb3l2 .1539418* .0161932 0.000 .1221935 .1856901
ctb3l3 .1278207* .0161796 0.000 .0960991 .1595422
ctb3l4 .3579709* .0154738 0.000 .3276331 .3883088
cdisr .0000706 .000709 0.921 -.0013193 .0014606
cfr -.000201 .000377 0.594 -.0009402 .0005382
_cons -.0242162* .0050547 0.000 -.0341263 -.0143061
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Table 3.6: Three month Treasury bill rate with five lags (equation 2)
ctb3 Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
ctb3l1 .2806045* .0165544 0.000 .248148 .313061
ctb3l2 .1437165* .0162691 0.000 .1118194 .1756136
ctb3l3 .1149804* .0163289 0.000 .082966 .1469949
ctb3l4 .3321171* .0162601 0.000 .3002377 .3639966
ctb3l5 .0831356* .016549 0.000 .0506897 .1155814
cdisr .0000723 .0007067 0.918 -.0013132 .0014578
cfr -.0002139 .0003758 0.569 -.0009507 .000523
_cons -.022061* .0050567 0.000 -.0319751 -.0121469
Table 3.7: Three month Treasury bill rate with six lags (equation 2)
ctb3 Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
ctb3l1 .2579442* .0162627 0.000 .2260596 .2898288
ctb3l2 .10663* .0168428 0.000 .0736081 .1396519
ctb3l3 .0381887* .0169298 0.024 .0049961 .0713812
ctb3l4 .2991155* .0161399 0.000 .2674718 .3307593
ctb3l5 .0354097* .0169365 0.037 .002204 .0686153
ctb3l6 .0253706 .0169021 0.133 -.0077675 .0585088
cfr -.0001272 .0003671 0.729 -.000847 .0005927
cdisr .0000705 .0006902 0.919 -.0012827 .0014238
_cons -.0153363* .0049692 0.002 -.0250789 -.0055938
Table 3.8: Result 2 (equation 3)
ctb3 Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
ctb3l1 (omitted)
ctb3l2 1* 4.87e-08 0.000 .9999999 1
ctb3l3 (omitted)
ctb3l4 (omitted)
ctb3l5 (omitted)
cdisr 7.24e-10* 2.65e-10 0.007 2.00e-10 1.25e-09
_cons .0005728* 1.88e-08 0.000 .0005727 .0005728
note: ctb3l1 omitted because of collinearity
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note: ctb3l3 omitted because of collinearity
note: ctb3l4 omitted because of collinearity
note: ctb3l5 omitted because of collinearity
Table 3.9: Result 3 (equation 4)
ctb3 Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
ctb3l1 (omitted)
ctb3l2 1* 3.12e-08 0.000 .9999999 1
ctb3l3 (omitted)
ctb3l4 (omitted)
ctb3l5 (omitted)
cdisr -1.86e-10 3.79e-10 0.624 -9.31e-10 5.59e-10
cfr -1.03e-10 1.04e-10 0.320 -3.07e-10 1.00e-10
_cons .0005728* 2.84e-08 0.000 .0005727 .0005728
note: ctb3l1 omitted because of collinearity
note: ctb3l3 omitted because of collinearity
note: ctb3l4 omitted because of collinearity
note: ctb3l5 omitted because of collinearity
Table 3.10: Result 3 (equation 5)
ctb3 Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
ctb3l1 (omitted)
ctb3l2 1* 3.12e-08 0.000 .9999999 1
ctb3l3 (omitted)
ctb3l4 (omitted)
ctb3l5 (omitted)
cdisr -1.83e-10 3.79e-10 0.629 -9.28e-10 5.62e-10
_cons .0005728* 2.84e-08 0.000 .0005727 .0005728
note: ctb3l1 omitted because of collinearity
note: ctb3l3 omitted because of collinearity
note: ctb3l4 omitted because of collinearity
note: ctb3l5 omitted because of collinearity
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Table 3.11 Test 1: The response of 3-month government repo rates to discount rate
changes (early 2000s recession)
grp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
grpl1 -.2015769 .0714822 0.005 -.3425728 -.060581
grpl2 -.1355546 .0711293 0.058 -.2758545 .0047452
cdisr .0400796 .0683406 0.558 -.0947196 .1748788
cfr -.0234814 .0225956 0.300 -.0680504 .0210877
_cons -.6709759 .2139097 0.002 -1.092905 -.2490471
Table 3.12 Test 2: The response of 3-month government repo rates to discount rate
changes (early 2000s recession)
grp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
grpl1 -.1768604 .0707759 0.013 -.3164586 -.0372622
cfr -.0259484 .0227126 0.255 -.0707467 .0188499
cdisr .0452273 .0687536 0.511 -.0903822 .1808367
_cons -.588219 .2108863 0.006 -1.00417 -.1722677
Table 3.13 Test 3: The response of 3-month government repo rates to discount rate
changes (early 2000s recession)
grp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
grpl1 -.2039575 .0714603 0.005 -.3449056 -.0630093
grpl2 -.1397893 .0710273 0.050 -.2798833 .0003046
cdisr .0360635 .0682454 0.598 -.0985436 .1706706
_cons -.6736794 .2139384 0.002 -1.095651 -.2517081
Table 3.14 Test 4: The response of 3-month government repo rates to discount rate
changes (early 2000s recession)
grp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
grpl1 -.1768604 .0707759 0.013 -.3164586 -.0372622
cfr -.0259484 .0227126 0.255 -.0707467 .0188499
cdisr .0452273 .0687536 0.511 -.0903822 .1808367
_cons -.588219 .2108863 0.006 -1.00417 -.1722677
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Table 3.15 Test 1: The response of 3-month government repo rates to discount rate
changes ("Great Recession")
grp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
grpl1 -.1476465 .0497475 0.003 -.2454427 -.0498502
grpl2 -.0107008 .050221 0.831 -.109428 .0880264
grpl3 -.06108 .0501838 0.224 -.1597339 .0375739
grpl4 -.0389005 .0502771 0.440 -.1377379 .0599369
grpl5 .013069 .0497225 0.793 -.084678 .1108161
cfr -.0612532 .1046648 0.559 -.2670089 .1445025
cdisr .1883457 .3893065 0.629 -.5769738 .9536651
_cons 1.546673 1.437916 0.283 -1.280058 4.373404
Table 3.16 Test 2: The response of 3-month government repo rates to discount rate
changes ("Great Recession")
grp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
grpl1 -.1453917 .0489904 0.003 -.2416968 -.0490866
cfr -.0579825 .10434 0.579 -.2630935 .1471286
cdisr .1833275 .3873337 0.636 -.5780913 .9447463
_cons 1.426264 1.427485 0.318 -1.37988 4.232408
Table 3.17 Test 3: The response of 3-month government repo rates to discount rate
changes ("Great Recession")
grp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
grpl1 -.1458307 .0495752 0.003 -.243286 -.0483753
grpl2 -.0030231 .0495471 0.951 -.1004233 .0943771
cfr -.0578666 .1044849 0.580 -.263264 .1475308
cdisr .1836013 .3878334 0.636 -.5788055 .9460081
_cons 1.430413 1.430848 0.318 -1.382362 4.243188
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Table 3.18 Test 4: The response of 3-month government repo rates to discount rate
changes ("Great Recession")
grp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
grpl1 -.1455727 .0489479 0.003 -.2417935 -.0493518
cdisr .1872495 .386942 0.629 -.5733938 .9478928
_cons 1.414239 1.426115 0.322 -1.38919 4.217669
Table 3.19 Test 1: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.1025694 .0725118 0.159 -.2455961 .0404573
arpl2 -.0024373 .0729517 0.973 -.1463319 .1414572
cfr -.007265 .0221868 0.744 -.0510276 .0364977
cdisr -.0216051 .0678359 0.750 -.1554089 .1121987
_cons -.5689471 .2097771 0.007 -.9827245 -.1551697
Table 3.20 Test 2: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.1023424 .0720046 0.157 -.2443641 .0396793
cfr -.0072905 .0221159 0.742 -.0509119 .0363309
cdisr -.0213135 .0670968 0.751 -.1536551 .1110281
_cons -.5674774 .2045785 0.006 -.9709873 -.1639674
Table 3.21 Test 3: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.1025267 .0723429 0.158 -.2452156 .0401621
arpl2 -.0032593 .0727388 0.964 -.1467291 .1402105
cdisr -.0228837 .0675658 0.735 -.1561503 .1103829
_cons -.569155 .2092879 0.007 -.9819536 -.1563563
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Table 3.22 Test 4: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.1023424 .0720046 0.157 -.2443641 .0396793
cfr -.0072905 .0221159 0.742 -.0509119 .0363309
cdisr -.0213135 .0670968 0.751 -.1536551 .1110281
_cons -.5674774 .2045785 0.006 -.9709873 -.1639674
Table 3.23 Test 5: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
cfr -.0071318 .022174 0.748 -.0508663 .0366027
cdisr -.0290446 .0670525 0.665 -.1612944 .1032052
_cons -.5211485 .2024982 0.011 -.9205421 -.1217549
Table 3.24 Test 6: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.1001265 .0729881 0.172 -.2441075 .0438545
arpl2 -.0019255 .0736781 0.979 -.1472676 .1434165
arpl3 .0175497 .0736834 0.812 -.1278027 .1629022
arpl4 -.0226244 .0732424 0.758 -.167107 .1218583
arpl5 .054783 .0729981 0.454 -.0892175 .1987836
cfr -.0066622 .0223299 0.766 -.0507116 .0373871
cdisr -.0277991 .0688965 0.687 -.1637087 .1081104
_cons -.5456446 .2211427 0.015 -.9818845 -.1094047
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Table 3.25 Test 1: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
("Great Recession")
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.5028742 .0496793 0.000 -.6005365 -.4052119
arpl2 -.2959229 .0551175 0.000 -.4042759 -.1875699
arpl3 -.1624143 .0563531 0.004 -.2731962 -.0516324
arpl4 -.0813604 .0549528 0.140 -.1893895 .0266687
arpl5 -.0321365 .0491841 0.514 -.1288252 .0645522
cfr -.0398113 .0410281 0.332 -.1204666 .040844
cdisr -.1221029 .1522449 0.423 -.421394 .1771883
_cons -.1068515 .5596822 0.849 -1.207105 .9934017
Table 3.26 Test 2: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
("Great Recession")
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.3836339 .0457761 0.000 -.4736204 -.2936474
cfr -.0341007 .0422349 0.420 -.1171259 .0489246
cdisr -.0870958 .156524 0.578 -.3947899 .2205983
_cons -.0862602 .5764683 0.881 -1.219479 1.046958
Table 3.27 Test 3: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
("Great Recession")
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.4662309 .0483391 0.000 -.5612564 -.3712054
arpl2 -.2158416 .0478941 0.000 -.3099922 -.121691
cfr -.0381661 .0412795 0.356 -.1193137 .0429815
cdisr -.1073132 .1530123 0.483 -.4081062 .1934798
_cons -.0923585 .5632942 0.870 -1.199688 1.014971
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Table 3.28 Test 4: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
("Great Recession")
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.3816794 .0456926 0.000 -.4715012 -.2918577
cdisr -.0850245 .1564363 0.587 -.3925441 .222495
_cons -.0934549 .5761541 0.871 -1.226048 1.039138
Table 3.29 Test 5: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
("Great Recession")
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.4902726 .0491112 0.000 -.5868151 -.39373
arpl2 -.2696619 .0527909 0.000 -.3734379 -.1658859
arpl3 -.1181446 .0486538 0.016 -.213788 -.0225012
_cons -.0670295 .5566543 0.904 -1.161298 1.027239
Table 3.30 Test 6: The response of 3-month agency repo rates to discount rate changes
("Great Recession")
arp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
arpl1 -.492894 .0492305 0.000 -.5896724 -.3961155
arpl2 -.2729168 .0528867 0.000 -.3768828 -.1689508
arpl3 -.1205972 .0487219 0.014 -.2163759 -.0248186
cdisr -.1204637 .1521504 0.429 -.4195646 .1786371
cfr -.0405921 .0410336 0.323 -.121257 .0400728
_cons -.1017703 .5597926 0.856 -1.202224 .9986835
Table 3.31 Test 1: The response of 3-month mortgage repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
mrp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
mrpl1 -.0917864 .0713402 0.200 -.2325023 .0489295
mrpl2 .0159791 .0712856 0.823 -.1246291 .1565873
cfr -.0054524 .0211391 0.797 -.0471484 .0362436
cdisr .1565391 .0640209 0.015 .0302604 .2828178
_cons -.4592702 .2005899 0.023 -.8549262 -.0636142
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Table 3.32 Test 2: The response of 3-month mortgage repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
mrp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
mrpl1 -.0934349 .0707844 0.188 -.2330499 .0461801
cfr -.0053515 .0210819 0.800 -.0469335 .0362304
cdisr .1569177 .0638401 0.015 .0309997 .2828356
_cons -.468113 .1961855 0.018 -.8550686 -.0811574
Table 3.33 Test 3: The response of 3-month mortgage repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
mrp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
mrpl1 -.0921355 .0711538 0.197 -.232479 .048208
mrpl2 .0155879 .071096 0.827 -.1246416 .1558175
cdisr .1556534 .0637731 0.016 .0298676 .2814393
_cons -.4594763 .2001001 0.023 -.8541531 -.0647995
Table 3.34 Test 4: The response of 3-month mortgage repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
mrp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
mrpl1 -.0934349 .0707844 0.188 -.2330499 .0461801
cfr -.0053515 .0210819 0.800 -.0469335 .0362304
cdisr .1569177 .0638401 0.015 .0309997 .2828356
_cons -.468113 .1961855 0.018 -.8550686 -.0811574
Table 3.35 Test 5: The response of 3-month mortgage repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
mrp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
cdisr .1616092 .0638635 0.012 .0356491 .2875693
cfr -.0058211 .0211194 0.783 -.0474757 .0358334
_cons -.4181375 .1928675 0.031 -.7985363 -.0377388
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Table 3.36 Test 6: The response of 3-month mortgage repo rates to discount rate changes
(early 2000s recession)
mrp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
cdisr .1606696 .0636204 0.012 .0351931 .2861462
_cons -.41795 .1924065 0.031 -.797427 -.038473
Table 3.37 Test 1: The response of 3-month mortgage repo rates to discount rate changes
("Great Recession")
mrp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
mrpl1 -.1828347 .0495796 0.000 -.2803009 -.0853686
mrpl2 -.0872755 .0502723 0.083 -.1861035 .0115525
mrpl3 -.0311055 .0504466 0.538 -.1302761 .068065
mrpl4 -.0585983 .0502152 0.244 -.1573139 .0401174
mrpl5 -.0940599 .0671058 0.162 -.2259801 .0378604
cfr -.0267551 .0975689 0.784 -.2185612 .165051
cdisr -.3766381 .495089 0.447 -1.34991 .5966342
_cons 1.216738 1.339524 0.364 -1.41657 3.850046
Table 3.38 Test 2: The response of 3-month mortgage repo rates to discount rate changes
("Great Recession")
mrp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
mrpl1 -.1636372 .0487712 0.001 -.2595115 -.067763
cfr -.0263583 .0977414 0.788 -.2184979 .1657813
cdisr .0330872 .3624525 0.927 -.6794203 .7455947
_cons 1.087429 1.336371 0.416 -1.539603 3.71446
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Table 3.39 Test 3: The response of 3-month mortgage repo rates to discount rate changes
("Great Recession")
mrp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
mrpl1 -.1765637 .0493379 0.000 -.2735526 -.0795748
mrpl2 -.0792302 .0493283 0.109 -.1762002 .0177398
cfr -.0246813 .0975583 0.800 -.2164624 .1670997
cdisr .0409496 .3617859 0.910 -.6702527 .7521519
_cons 1.181205 1.335068 0.377 -1.443286 3.805695
Table 3.40 Test 4: The response of 3-month mortgage repo rates to discount rate changes
("Great Recession")
mrp Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
mrpl1 -.1632786 .0486978 0.001 -.2590078 -.0675494
cdisr .0348303 .3619838 0.923 -.6767507 .7464112
_cons 1.081497 1.334674 0.418 -1.542181 3.705175
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